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“It seems good to mark and to remember for a little while the place
where a man died.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Private roadside memorials are part of a growing trend among the
bereaved who seek to “make sense of senseless deaths” along the pub-
lic roadways.2  These memorials, which often feature a Latin cross,
are part of deeply meaningful bereavement practices that support the
grieving process.  As such, these memorials are created to satisfy a
human need during a time of crisis and are, therefore, largely con-
structed without regard to the legality of erecting such markers.3
Courts have yet to provide clear guidance on the constitutionality of
erecting and maintaining these private memorials on public spaces.
This Article considers the constitutional guideposts for evaluating
roadside memorial crosses and offers some practical solutions for
policymakers struggling to balance the needs of the bereaved with the
interests of the community.
1. JOHN STEINBECK, THE LOG FROM THE SEA OF CORTEZ 70 (1941).
2. Robert M. Bednar, Denying Denial: Trauma, Memory, and Automobility at Road-
side Car Crash Shrines, in RHETORIC, REMEMBRANCE AND VISUAL FORM 128, 129,
134 (Anne Teresa Demo & Bradford Vivian eds., 2012); Charles O. Collins &
Charles D. Rhine, Roadside Memorials, 47 OMEGA 221, 221 (2003).
3. Holly Everett, Roadside Crosses and Memorial Complexes in Texas, 111 FOLK-
LORE 91, 96 (2000); Jon K. Reid & Cynthia L. Reid, A Cross Marks the Spot: A
Study of Roadside Death Memorials in Texas and Oklahoma, 25 DEATH STUD.
341, 349, 352 (2001).
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126 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:124
These memorials are intensely personal, idiosyncratic expressions
motivated by a seemingly senseless death.4  Senseless deaths along
the roadways surprise and shock us because modern technological ad-
vances lull us into thinking we have some measure of control over
death.5  Roadside memorials are most often created by friends and
family members of teenagers who die in car crashes.6  Scholars con-
firm that public opinions about roadside memorials are mixed: “Some
claim never to see them, some are angered by them, some place them
by the side of the road and never go back, others tend them regu-
larly.”7  Public officials are often concerned about the visual distrac-
tion and traffic hazards these memorials can create.8
Two instances, one from Massachusetts and the other from Austra-
lia, illustrate some of the tension between the needs of the bereaved
and the interests of the public.  In Shutesbury, Massachusetts, a sev-
enteen-year-old died in a one-car accident, and the teen’s father con-
structed a roadside cross to commemorate his “last alive” place.9  Two
homeowners who lived near the accident site wanted the cross re-
moved.  The cross commemorated the site at the end of one of the
homeowner’s driveway for over six years.  The homeowners said it was
a constant, painful reminder of the night they and other neighbors
went to aid the dying teen.10
In Ormeau, Australia, a nineteen-year-old was struck and killed by
a vehicle as he walked home.  His memorial was thrice vandalized
when the teen’s laminated photograph was taken down and the flow-
4. Jennifer Clark & Majella Franzmann, Authority from Grief, Presence and Place
in the Making of Roadside Memorials, 30 DEATH STUD. 579, 584 (2006); C. Allen
Haney et al., Spontaneous Memorialization: Violent Death and Emerging Mourn-
ing Ritual, 35 OMEGA 159, 162 (1997).
5. Haney et al., supra note 4, at 161. R
6. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 226 (“Among the 18 deaths documented in the R
survey, the average victim was 17, with a range from 7 months to 34 years.”);
Reid & Reid, supra note 3, at 347 (“The modal age was 17, with 11 [of 78] of the R
deceased being of this age.  The next closest age in frequency was 19, with 4
decedents.”).
7. Reid & Reid, supra note 3, at 341. R
8. See, e.g., Arizona Removing Roadside Memorials: Families Upset Over State Pol-
icy; Officials Point to Safety Concerns, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 6, 2007, at A1, availa-
ble at 2007 WLNR 27636278 (“The roadside memorials, [the Arizona Department
of Transportation] says, are too much of a safety hazard and can be too distract-
ing for motorists.”).
9. Nick Grabbe, Leverett Neighborhood Wrestles with Weight of Cross, AMHERST
BULL. (June 27, 2008), http://www.amherstbulletin.com/story/id/98909/, cited in
George E. Dickinson & Heath C. Hoffmann, Roadside Memorial Policies in the
United States, 15 MORTALITY 154, 163–64 (2010).
10. Grabbe, supra note 9; cf. Residents Condemn Roadside Gravestone, PLYMOUTH R
EVENING HERALD, Aug. 30, 2008, at 5, available at 2008 WLNR 16446088 (“Since
the appearance of the inscribed headstone we [government officials] have re-
ceived many complaints from local residents who find it very distressing to be
reminded of this young man’s tragic death when they pass every day.”).
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ers were removed.  A note was left on the memorial site explaining the
removal: “The community of Ormeau have [sic] endured this memorial
site for one year and two months and we feel that is by far long
enough.”11  The note also admonished the teen’s parents that the
roadside was not a gravesite and that the family should be thoughtful
of the community.  In response, the teen’s parents proclaimed the
right to grieve for as long as necessary: “We never put the cross there
to offend anyone. This has absolutely gutted our family. It’s not al-
ways going to be there, but it should be up to us to take it down when
we’re ready.”12
Within the legal scholarship there has been no systematic exami-
nation of the roadside memorial phenomenon or the animating forces
behind the growing popularity of commemorating the “last alive” place
of a loved one.13  Understanding the phenomenon is an important first
step in analyzing the Free Speech and Establishment Clause issues
that are raised by the presence of these private memorials on public
space.  The Supreme Court has emphasized that “there is a crucial
difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion,
which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.”14  This Ar-
ticle joins the legal scholarship exploring “mixed speech,” which is
neither purely private speech nor purely government speech.15
This Article canvasses the interdisciplinary literature devoted to
the roadside memorial phenomenon and then examines the Free
11. Selina Steele, Hard Road—Vandals Target Memorials, SUNDAY MAIL (Queensl.,
Austl.), Feb. 11, 2001, at 7, cited in Clark & Franzmann, supra note 4, at 587; see R
also Vandals Target Roadside Memorial, THE MISSISSAUGA NEWS, Oct. 4, 2012, at
1, available at 2012 WLNR 21153366 (“A Mississauga man [in Canada] is heart-
broken that items are continually being removed from his son’s roadside memo-
rial in Georgetown.”)
12. Steele, supra note 11, cited in Clark & Franzmann, supra note 4, at 587. R
13. Cf. Eric B. Ashcroft, Note, American Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport: Endorsing a
Presumption of Unconstitutionality Against Potentially Religious Symbols, 2012
BYU L. REV. 371 (2012) (arguing the Tenth Circuit incorrectly applied the en-
dorsement test by concluding the roadside memorial crosses violated the Estab-
lishment Clause); Elizabeth A. Murphy, Note, Courts Mistakenly Cross-Out
Memorials: Why the Establishment Clause is Not Violated by Roadside Crosses,
39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 723 (2011) (arguing privately maintained roadside memorial
crosses do not violate the Establishment Clause).
14. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (quoting Bd. of Educ.
v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)).
15. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008); Claudia E. Haupt, Mixed Public-
Private Speech and the Establishment Clause, 85 TUL. L. REV. 571 (2011); Andy
G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365 (2009); Amy Riley
Lucas, Comment, Specialty License Plates: The First Amendment and the Inter-
section of Government Speech and Public Forum Doctrines, 55 UCLA L. REV.
1971 (2008); Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Ex-
pression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587 (2008).
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Speech interests of memorial makers and the Establishment Clause
concerns raised by having private crosses along public roadways.  Part
I describes the history and animating forces behind the roadside me-
morial phenomenon.  Part II traces public opinion and public policies
regarding roadside memorials.  In response to this growing phenome-
non, state and local policymakers have adopted a patchwork of regula-
tions that range from allowing and promoting roadside memorials to
banning and removing all privately made memorials.  Public senti-
ments mirror this range of policies with some individuals respecting
and applauding roadside crosses, while others within the community
object to the macabre eyesores that seek to sanctify the public road-
ways.  Parts III and IV set out the Free Speech and Establishment
Clause framework within which the roadside memorial phenomenon
rests.  Memorial makers have a Free Speech claim to erect a marker
on the “last alive” place of a loved one, and governments must be care-
ful not to appear to endorse a religious message and violate the Estab-
lishment Clause by allowing religiously themed markers to remain on
public property.16
The unresolved question that is explored in Part V is whether a
government creates grounds for an Establishment Clause challenge
by either erecting or allowing roadside crosses to remain along public
roadways.  It is unclear what the consequences are for states that al-
low private memorial crosses to remain on public roadways.  It is also
unclear what happens when official, state-sponsored markers are sup-
plemented with private crosses and religious messages, which the gov-
ernment does not remove.
Private religious speech in a designated or traditional public forum
is generally free from Establishment Clause concerns.17  However,
private religious speech may lose its “purely private” nature by its
placement in a public space.18  The public roadways have not been
treated as traditional public fora where individuals can express them-
selves without government restraint or limitation.  And by not remov-
ing the private religious displays, it is unclear if a government runs
16. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 486 (2009) (Souter, J., con-
curring) (“[W]henever a government maintains a monument [that] has some re-
ligious character, the specter of violating the Establishment Clause will behoove
it to take care to avoid the appearance of a flat-out establishment of religion, in
the sense of the government’s adoption of the tenets expressed or symbolized.”).
17. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 767, 770 (1995)
(plurality opinion) (“By its terms [the Establishment] Clause applies only to the
words and acts of government.  It was never meant, and has never been read by
this Court, to serve as an impediment to purely private religious speech con-
nected to the State only through its occurrence in a public forum.”).
18. See Haupt, supra note 15, at 588.
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the risk of appearing to tacitly adopt the religious message.19  The Su-
preme Court in Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum reflected this
position when it explained, “It certainly is not common for property
owners to open up their property for the installation of permanent
monuments that convey a message with which they do not wish to be
associated.”20  Therefore, according to the Court, “Because property
owners typically do not permit the construction of such monuments on
their land, persons who observe donated monuments routinely—and
reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on the prop-
erty owner’s behalf.”21
Monuments and symbols are subject to more than one interpreta-
tion.  And these monuments and symbols can communicate a message
on behalf of more than one speaker.  The roadside crosses undoubtedly
speak on behalf of the private individuals who were motivated to erect
them.  But, by allowing the roadside crosses to remain on public prop-
erty, the government may also passively adopt the message of the me-
morial cross.
Constitutionally permissible avenues for policymakers to address
roadside memorials are discussed in Part V.  Governments that create
a limited public forum for the bereaved to express the two-fold mes-
sage of remembrance of the deceased and caution to other drivers may
satisfy the Free Speech interests of the memorial makers.  Addition-
ally, Establishment Clause concerns about government endorsement
of religion may be forestalled if the government consistently applies
viewpoint-neutral criteria for speakers and topics and also disclaims
control or endorsement of the message.
19. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 471; see also Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 800 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (“[S]igns and symbols are generally understood to express the
[property] owner’s views.”).
20. Summum, 555 U.S. at 471.
21. Id. at 471.  A government that speaks through a religious display is making a
dangerous gamble.  Chief Justice Roberts’s first question at Summum oral argu-
ment reflected this danger.
[Y]ou’re really just picking your poison, aren’t you? I mean, the more you
say that the monument is Government speech to get out of the . . . Free
Speech Clause, the more it seems to me you’re walking into a trap under
the Establishment Clause.  If it’s Government speech, [declining to dis-
play Summum’s “Seven Aphorisms” stone monument in a public park]
may not present a free speech problem, but what is the Government do-
ing speaking – supporting the Ten Commandments?
Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (No. 07-665).
This tension has not escaped scholarly attention.  Blake R. Bertagna, The Gov-
ernment’s Ten Commandments: Pleasant Grove City v. Summum and the Govern-
ment Speech Doctrine, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 1 (2009); Erwin Chemerinsky, A
Dangerous Free Speech Ruling, TRIAL, July 2009, at 60; Mary Jean Dolan, Gov-
ernment Identity Speech and Religion: The Establishment Clause Limits After
Summum, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (2010); Lisa Shaw Roy, Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum: Monuments, Messages, and the Next Establishment Clause, 104
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 280 (2010).
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II. TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROADSIDE
MEMORIAL PHENOMENON
A. Roadside Memorials Are Growing in Popularity
The roadside memorial phenomenon is growing in popularity
across the country.22  As scholar Keith Suter notes, “Death has moved
out of the cemetery.”23  This new social trend has proliferated over the
past two decades.24  Scholars argue that while it is a new social trend,
it is not merely a fad.25  This phenomenon, scholars explain, “is part of
a longer and complex story about the meaning of both death and griev-
ing in a particular time and place.”26
The nationwide diffusion of roadside memorials can be seen in
every state, including Hawaii and Alaska.27  And while it is a rela-
tively recent trend around the country, in some southwestern states,
especially Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, the practice dates back
more than 200 years.28  This blended, or syncretic, expression is
thought to reflect Hispanic, Catholic, and indigenous influences.29  In
the American Southwest, small white crosses were placed at the road-
side to mark the rest areas for funeral procession pallbearers travel-
ing by foot from the church to the graveyard.30  These sanctified and
holy rest areas, called “descansos”—which means “resting places” in
Spanish—have since evolved into memorials to commemorate deaths
at traffic fatality locations.31
Today, roadside memorials are no longer just an idiosyncratic, ru-
ral, southwestern practice; they can be seen across the globe.32  Road-
side memorials are becoming an international phenomenon and are
along the roadways in New Zealand, Australia, the Middle East, Eu-
22. See, e.g., Keith Suter, Roadside Memorials: Sacred Places in a Secular Era, 292
CONTEMP. REV. 51, 51 (2010) (“The creation of ad hoc ephemeral memorials (as
distinct from stone or other permanent memorials) had suddenly become a fact of
contemporary life.”).
23. Id.
24. Clark & Franzmann, supra note 4, at 580 (“[T]he practice has proliferated in the R
last 15 odd years and drawn the attention of scholars and journalists who argue
they represent a new social trend.”).
25. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 236 (“[I]t becomes evident that most roadside R
memorials are not the product of a fad but someone’s abiding involvement with a
place.”).
26. JOHN BELSHAW & DIANE PURVEY, PRIVATE GRIEF, PUBLIC MOURNING: THE RISE OF
THE ROADSIDE SHRINE IN BRITISH COLUMBIA 15 (2009).
27. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 222–23. R
28. Id.; Dickinson & Hoffmann, supra note 9, at 154. R
29. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 221; Holly J. Everett, Crossroads: Roadside R
Accident Memorials in and Around Austin, Texas 51 (June 30, 1998) (unpub-
lished M.A. thesis, Memorial University of Newfoundland).
30. Dickinson & Hoffman, supra note 9, at 155. R
31. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 224–25. R
32. Id. at 225.
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 70 Side A      08/28/2013   10:13:22
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 70 Side A      08/28/2013   10:13:22
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\92-1\NEB105.txt unknown Seq: 8 27-AUG-13 10:54
2013] PRIVATE MEMORIALS ON PUBLIC SPACE 131
rope, Japan, and the Americas.33  Roadside memorials are erected in
both rural and urban spaces: “Shrines are erected on busy street cor-
ners adjacent to megastores and fast food restaurants, in the medians
of multilane roadways and freeways, and on private property.”34
B. Road Death Is a “Bad Death”
In our modern society, death is professionally managed and largely
invisible.35  With modern advances, people are living longer, healthier
lives,36 and death is less present in our daily consciousness.37  Mat-
ters of death are handed over to the professionals: law enforcement,
emergency medical technicians, doctors, coroners, funeral directors,
and ministers.38  In North America, nearly three-quarters of all
deaths today occur in health care institutions.39  Death has moved out
of the home and into professional institutions, with the majority of
deaths now taking place in hospitals and nursing homes.40  Rather
than caring for dying family members in the home, the current trend
is to outsource that care to third-party professionals.41  Death is no
longer an integrated part of life; it is insulated within institutions of
death.42  And consequently, we are less accustomed to death, and a
sudden, unexpected death often leaves the bereaved traumatized and
shocked.43
Unexpected, violent deaths of individuals participating in the rou-
tines of life that we think are safe, such as daily commutes, are consid-
33. Jennifer Clark, Challenging Motoring Functionalism: Roadside Memorials, Heri-
tage & History in Australia & New Zealand, 29 J. TRANSPORT HIST. 23, 24 (2008);
Dickinson & Hoffmann, supra note 9, at 155; Rebecca M. Kennerly, Getting R
Messy: In the Field and at the Crossroads with Roadside Shrines, 22 TEXT & PER-
FORMANCE Q. 229, 240–41 (2002).
34. Everett, supra note 3, at 91. R
35. DAVID WENDELL MOLLER, CONFRONTING DEATH: VALUES, INSTITUTIONS, AND
HUMAN MORTALITY 112 (1996) (noting that modern advances have made death
“culturally invisible”); Margaret Gibson, Death and Grief in the Landscape: Pri-
vate Memorials in Public Space, 17 CULTURAL STUD. REV. 146, 146 (2011) (“The
place and space of death is highly managed and regulated in modern society, cre-
ating the taken-for-granted attitude that death will be largely absent and invisi-
ble in most everyday environments.”).
36. Howard E. Freeman et al., New Dimensions of Dying, in THE DYING PATIENT xiii,
xvi (Orville G. Brim, Jr. et al., eds., 1981) (noting “whereas half the population
used to die before the age of 40, half now live beyond the age of 70”).
37. Bednar, supra note 2, at 134. R
38. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 234. R
39. Kenneth V. Iserson, Notifying Survivors About Sudden, Unexpected Deaths, 173
W. J. MED., 261, 262 (2000) (“In the United States and Canada, about 70% of
deaths occur in health care institutions . . . .”).
40. Freeman et al., supra note 36, at xvii. R
41. Id.
42. JACK B. KAMERMAN, DEATH IN THE MIDST OF LIFE: SOCIAL AND CULTURAL INFLU-
ENCES ON DEATH, GRIEF AND MOURNING 8 (1988).
43. Haney et al., supra note 4, at 169; Suter, supra note 22, at 57. R
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ered “bad deaths.”44  Anthropologist David Lee Kozak explains the
difference between a “good death” and a “bad death”: “A ‘good’ death is
essentially any death that is due to old age, prolonged sickness, or a
‘natural’ death that comes gradually and is therefore expected.  A ‘bad’
death . . . is one that is sudden, violent, unpredicted, and therefore
‘unnatural.’ ”45
In the United States, more than 30,000 people die in traffic colli-
sions each year.46  In developed nations, traffic fatalities are becoming
a leading cause of death.47  The World Health Organization estimates
1.2 million people are killed in road crashes each year worldwide, re-
sulting in economic costs exceeding $500 billion.48  In spite of the sta-
tistics on road deaths, the public generally perceives driving to be a
safe activity.  Professor and road safety expert Richard Tay notes that
because of this perceived safety, “road fatalities are often received
with great shock.”49
A road fatality is often shocking to friends and family because the
sudden, unexpected death of a young, healthy person violates our ex-
pectations.  Professor of surgery and bioethics Kenneth Iserson ex-
plains that a sudden death “leaves survivors unprepared for the
loss.”50  The unexpected death leaves survivors in a different type of
shock and affects the grieving process in a different way than does an
expected death.  Such deaths, Dr. Iserson explains, “strike blows to
the very essence of life for those left behind.”51
44. David Lee Kozak, Dying Badly: Violent Death and Religious Change Among the
Tohono O’Odham, 23 OMEGA 207, 213 (1991).
45. Id.
46. See FARS Data Tables, Summary, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., http:/
/www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/Main/index.aspx (last visited December 15, 2012) (show-
ing motor vehicle crashes and fatalities from 1994 to 2009 and noting The Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) reported 30,797 fatal car
crashes for 2009); Traffic Safety Facts Crash Stats, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMIN. (Apr. 2011), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811451.pdf (not-
ing NHTSA also reported 33,808 motor vehicle deaths in 2009 and 32,788 in
2010); STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012 693 (2011), available
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/trans.pdf (showing that the
U.S. Census Bureau reported 35,900 deaths caused by motor vehicle accidents in
2009).
47. Suter, supra note 22, at 54 (“A person dies in a road accident somewhere around R
the world every 30 seconds.”).
48. WORLD REPORT ON ROAD TRAFFIC INJURY PREVENTION 3, 5 (Margie Peden et al.
eds., 2004), available at http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/publica-
tions/road_traffic/world_report/chapter1.pdf.
49. Richard Tay, Drivers’ Perceptions and Reactions to Roadside Memorials, 41 ACCI-
DENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 663, 663 (2009); Richard Tay et al., Effects of Road-
side Memorials on Traffic Flow, 43 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 483, 483
(2011).
50. Iserson, supra note 39, at 261. R
51. Id.  Sociology professor Kathy Charmaz confirms that a sudden death, in which
there is “no particular anticipation, suggestion, or wish,” has the capacity to
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Neuropsychologist Robyn Howarth confirms that “[t]he loss of a
loved one is one of the most distressing emotional experiences people
face, yet virtually everyone will deal with grief at some point.”52  Even
though distressing, the majority of bereaved individuals experience
“uncomplicated grief.”53  However, for some people, “complicated
grief” follows sudden, traumatic, and unexpected losses.  Dr. Howarth
explains normal, uncomplicated grief: “Despite the emotional diffi-
culty associated with loss, most people experience a ‘normal’ grieving
process in which they endure a period of sorrow, numbness, and even
guilt or anger, followed by a gradual fading of these feelings as the
griever accepts the loss and moves forward.”54  Complicated grief, on
the other hand, deviates from the norm in duration and symptom in-
tensity.55  Complicated grief, according to Dr. Howarth, “is character-
ized by a sense of disbelief, anger and bitterness, recurrent emotional
pangs, yearning and longing, and preoccupation with thoughts of the
deceased, which often include intrusive thoughts about the death.”56
Researchers confirm that the sudden, traumatic, and unexpected
death of a child is one of the most intense grief experiences for a par-
ent.57  Thus, complicated grief and bereavement should be expected
for road deaths of young, healthy individuals.58
“temporarily disrupt[ ] the character of ordinary events” for the bereaved. KATHY
CHARMAZ, THE SOCIAL REALITY OF DEATH 142 (1980).
52. Robyn A. Howarth, Concepts and Controversies in Grief and Loss, 33 J. MENTAL
HEALTH COUNSELING 4, 4 (2011).
53. Selby Jacobs & Kathleen Kim, Psychiatric Complications of Bereavement, 20 PSY-
CHIATRIC ANNALS 314, 314–17 (1990).
54. Howarth, supra note 52, at 4. R
55. Id. at 5.
56. Paula L. Hensley & Paula J. Clayton, Bereavement: Signs, Symptoms, and
Course, 38 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 649, 650 (2008).
57. See generally CELIA HINDMARCH, ON THE DEATH OF A CHILD (3d ed. 2009); Grace
A. Seecharan et al., Parents’ Assessment of Quality of Care and Grief Following a
Child’s Death, 158 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 515, 515–20 (2004)
(finding fathers and mothers had similar levels of grief, and mothers who exper-
ienced the sudden death of a child had somewhat more intense grief reactions
than those whose child died of a chronic condition).
58. See generally THERESE A. RANDO, TREATMENT OF COMPLICATED MOURNING (1993).
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C. Constructing the Roadside Memorial
Roadside memorials are not limited to any religion or heritage.59
And while roadside memorials are individual and unique,60 they often
share common qualities.61  In constructing roadside memorials, build-
ers overwhelmingly choose a Latin cross as the focal point.62  Scholars
who have studied roadside memorials confirm that “[t]he one univer-
sal theme among roadside memorials, if indeed any exists, is that the
cross is a dominant feature of most roadside memorials . . . .”63
While crosses are often used in roadside memorials, the symbol is
not always used for purely religious reasons.64  Roadside crosses are
multivocal and can be used to communicate a range of meaning, from
the plainly religious to the quasi-secular.65  For some memorial mak-
ers, the Latin cross is used as a generic marker of death rather than
as an exclusively Christian symbol.66  The cross can represent amor-
59. Researchers John Belshaw and Diane Purvey confirm “roadside shrines are not
homogenous in their origin, their kind, their meaning, or their intent.  This is
true within some regions and internationally.  But in their diversity, there is a
sameness.” BELSHAW & PURVEY, supra note 26, at 67. See also Kennerly, supra R
note 33, at 240–41 (“While roadside shrines have appeared consistently and R
profusely in the Southwest, further research suggests that the practice is not
linked to any particular geographic region.”).
60. Dickinson & Hoffmann, supra note 9, at 156 (“[R]oadside memorials carry tre- R
mendous diversity in style and origin.”).
61. Clark, supra note 33, at 34 (“Visual similarities—and there are many—point to R
roadside memorialisation [sic] as an identifiable phenomenon.”).
62. Reid & Reid, supra note 3, at 349 (finding in a study of seventy-eight roadside R
memorials, crosses were featured prominently in seventy-three of the sites);
Deborah L. Wagner, Death, Memory, and Space: A Rural Community Response
to Roadside Memorials 4 (August 2008) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of
Texas at San Antonio) (on file with author) (“Of the sites identified in this study,
85 percent incorporated a cross into the feature and of these 100 percent were
Latin crosses (the vertical length is greater than the horizontal crossbar).”); see
also Clark & Franzmann, supra note 4, at 580 n.i (finding that out of 430 road- R
side memorials in Australia and New Zealand identified between 1989 and 2004,
93% of the memorials used a cross as the primary structure).
63. Dickinson & Hoffmann, supra note 9, at 164.  Moreover, “The cross is typically R
the memorial when a religious symbol is displayed.” Id.
64. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 229–30 (“Here, then, appears to be a dichotomy: R
crosses are overwhelmingly employed in the design of memorials but apparently
more as a matter of cultural integration, i.e., a reflex as opposed to an intentional
or specific act of faith, at least in an institutional or denominational sense.”). See
also Clark, supra note 33, at 35 (“The cross acts as the central element from R
which other elements radiate, because the cross as body forms an easy structure
upon or around which to hang, display, or build other elements.”).
65. Everett, supra note 3, at 91. R
66. Clark, supra note 33, at 34 (“The cross is a recognisable [sic] Christian symbol, R
but it is most likely used by memorial makers as a symbol of death.  At the same
time the cross physically separates a sacred place from a secular space.”); Chris
Ross, Roadside Memorials: Public Policy vs. Private Expression, AM. CITY &
COUNTY, May 1, 1998, at 50, 53 (“Memorial supporters acknowledge religious con-
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phous spirituality67 and may be a popular choice to generically sym-
bolize death because of the dearth of other appropriate symbols to
commemorate a death.68  The Latin cross can also symbolize the
human form, with the horizontal crossbar representing outstretched
arms and the vertical beam representing the head and body.69  Often,
in multiple-person fatalities, a separate cross is used to represent each
person.70
Some roadside memorials are only a simple white cross, whereas
others include elaborate displays of objects and mementos.71  The to-
kens incorporated into the elaborate displays can include flowers, can-
dles, teddy bears, photographs, rosaries, scarves, sports equipment,
handwritten notes, poems, and music, as well as car parts from the
wreckage.72  Some of these memorials have new objects added for spe-
cial occasions such as birthdays, holidays, and the anniversary of the
cerns, but feel that the use of the cross symbol as a marker of death is so practical
and universal that it essentially transcends the original Christian symbolism.”).
67. Clark & Franzmann, supra note 4, at 591 (“The memorial cross has become a R
symbol of amorphous spirituality easily detached from any particular
institution.”).
68. Id. (“The use of the cross may, in fact, be little more than an attempt to find
culturally appropriate symbols to express death and the sacred, where there is a
paucity of such symbols apart from those offered by institutional religion.”).
69. Compare MARGARET VISSER, THE GEOMETRY OF LOVE: SPACE, TIME, MYSTERY AND
MEANING IN AN ORDINARY CHURCH 32 (2000) (identifying and analyzing the cross
as a representation of the human form reflected in the architecture of a church;
“A church is often cross-shaped—that is, in the form of a human body, with the
arms constituted by the transept, the head by the apse, and the heart by the
altar.”), with Clark, supra note 33, at 35–36 (identifying and analyzing the cross R
in roadside memorials as a visual depiction of the fragility of the human body;
“Nowhere is their pattern clearer or more stark than on the road at Huntly be-
tween Hamilton and Auckland in New Zealand where a life-size cross wears a
black jacket.”).
70. Clark, supra note 33, at 35. R
71. Bednar, supra note 2, at 129. R
72. See, e.g., Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 230 (noting “the widespread and some- R
times prolonged practice of leaving flowers, notes, poems, photos, music tapes,
CDs, scarves, pinwheels, balloons, and less frequently, beer, pretzels, or candy at
the site”); Dickinson & Hoffmann, supra note 9, at 154 (“The memorial may be R
decorated with flowers, a teddy bear, a football jersey, a toy, photograph, or some
other personal item of the deceased person.”); Everett, supra note 3, at 91–92 R
(noting roadside memorials “incorporate any number of changing elements, in-
cluding flowers (both fresh and artificial), toys, photographs, ceramic figurines,
handwritten notes, religious objects (saint statuettes and pictures, rosaries), sea-
sonal decorations such as Christmas ornaments or Easter eggs, and car parts
collected from the wreckage of the inciting accident”); Kennerly, supra note 33, at R
235 (noting the artifacts or tokens left at the memorial can include personal
items, like a hard hat, boots, cigarette lighter, a shot glass, jewelry, wind chimes
or toys, or automobile parts from the wreckage, or religious items, like a rosary,
crucifix, and statues of the Virgin Mary or other saints).
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death.73  Professor of Folklore Holly Everett explains, “Items placed at
many of the crosses reflect an ongoing dialogue with the deceased
(notes, inscriptions on bridge railings), and the continuation of missed
celebrations (toys, homecoming mums, graduation tassels).”74  While
the tokens or “offerings” are often left at a roadside memorial by
friends and family members of the deceased, strangers sometimes add
to the memorial, too.75
Another common feature of roadside memorials is that they are
created as close as possible to the “last alive” place,76 which is often on
a public right-of-way.77  The “last alive” place has deeply meaningful
significance for the bereaved.78  Often memorial makers take great ef-
fort to identify precisely where they believe the “last alive” place to
be.79  Clues like blood stains and tire tracks on the ground where a
vehicle stopped are often used to identify the now sacred place.80  Me-
morial makers treat this space as sacred.81  The meaning and sacred-
ness of the space comes from the spilled blood at the accident site.
Because of the meaningfulness of the place, these memorials often
reflect a blended sense of spirituality and the maker’s own sense of
what ritual is appropriate and necessary.82  Even when memorials are
unlawful, family and friends assert a self-proclaimed sense of author-
ity to erect the memorial because, as scholars Jennifer Clark and
Majella Franzmann explain, the bereaved’s authority is “drawn from
the intensity of grief, from a belief in the spiritual presence of the de-
ceased, combined with a profound sense of the importance of place.”83
73. Clark & Franzmann, supra note 4, at 590; Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 230; R
Dickinson & Hoffmann, supra note 9, at 154. R
74. Everett, supra note 29 (thesis at 133). R
75. Clark & Franzmann, supra note 4, at 590; Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 232. R
76. Clark, supra note 33, at 38; Suter, supra note 22, at 53. R
77. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 226. R
78. Clark & Franzmann, supra note 4, at 589 (“There is material evidence at the R
memorial sites that communication with the deceased takes place, and that the
deceased is believed to be present in some way and capable of receiving the com-
munication.”); Everett, supra note 3, at 98 (“[F]or some of those whom I inter- R
viewed, the accident site was the last place where their loved one was conscious,
and thus really ‘alive,’ regardless of the place of clinical death.”).
79. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 227–28. R
80. Id. at 228.
81. See Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 228.  Professor Emerita of Anthropology R
Sylvia Grider confirms that “many people regard roadside crosses as sacred but
not necessarily religious.”  Sylvia Grider, Should Roadside Memorials Be
Banned?, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2009, 7:00 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.ny-
times.com/2009/07/12/should-roadside-memorials-be-banned/.
82. Clark & Franzmann, supra note 4, at 589.  Roadside memorials “demonstrate an R
eclectic use of traditional mourning symbols unprescribed and undirected by any
recognized or authorized practitioner of ritual.” Id. at 582.
83. Id. at 579.  The bereaved are often willing to “kick up a fuss” to erect a memorial.
Id. (observing “more and more families and friends touched by tragedy are willing
to ‘kick up a fuss,’ assume authority to express their grief in ways that implicitly
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The perceived higher moral knowledge of mourners appears to em-
power them to grieve the way they desire.84  Clark and Franzmann
note that mourners are “willing to take grief out of the confines of the
cemetery and beyond the emotional and spiritual boundaries of the
church, to construct for themselves a new sacred place fully recogniz-
ing that this process is open-ended and only those who grieve know
when it is time to stop.”85
D. The Message of the Roadside Memorial
Roadside memorials communicate in a way grave markers tucked
away in a quiet cemetery cannot.86  Professor of communication stud-
ies Robert Bednar has examined the roadside memorial phenomenon
and articulates the dual message of the memorials.  On the one hand,
the message is:
This should not have happened; I do not accept this as a matter of course; I
will not allow you to ignore it either; by building this shrine where I have, I
am making my personal story public; I refuse to forget, and I refuse to let you
forget either.87
On the other hand, Professor Bednar notes the memorials say: “[D]on’t
let this happen to you or someone who loves you or someone you love—
where ‘this’ is not only the crash and the death but also the materially
present grief and anguish that drives the construction of the shrine
itself.”88  The roadside memorial can serve as a pilgrimage site for
family and friends to remember and respect the deceased.89  But it
can also serve as a warning to other drivers.90  And this warning to
others can help the bereaved find meaning in an otherwise meaning-
less death.91
Private memorials on public space, made sacred by the death of a
loved one, may be an attempt to counter a meaningless and anony-
and explicitly challenge the authority of church or state, and transform the road-
side into their own sacred space”).
84. Id. at 588.  As evidenced by the behavior of the memorial makers, it appears
these memorial makers believe “the mourning family has the moral authority to
express their grief and that this should take precedence over government regula-
tions and concerns.” Id. at 587.
85. Id. at 588. See also Haney et al., supra note 4, at 162 (“Spontaneous memoriali- R
zation is not constrained by culturally-based norms which prescribe the amount
of time allotted for ritual action nor the appropriate amount of time for
bereavement.”).
86. Everett, supra note 29 (thesis at 185). R
87. Bednar, supra note 2, at 137. R
88. Id.
89. George Monger, Modern Wayside Shrines, 108 FOLKLORE 113, 114 (1997).
90. Everett, supra note 29 (thesis at 178); Monger, supra note 89, at 114. R
91. Everett, supra note 29 (thesis at 179) (“Viewing the crosses as cautionary and R
potentially life-saving helps those who have lost a loved one in a fatal collision
locate meaning in an otherwise senseless death.”).
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mous death.92  Road deaths are largely anonymous as modern forces
work quickly and efficiently to remove evidence of an accident.  The
dead or injured are swiftly removed from the scene and any road dam-
age is repaired as soon as possible.93  Roadside memorials mark and
identify what would otherwise be an invisible death spot.94  Therefore,
roadside memorials may be a way to forestall an anonymous, deper-
sonalized death on the modern roadway.95
For some bereaved, the ritual of creating a roadside memorial
meets a human need that interment in a cemetery cannot.96  Grieving
rituals offer the bereaved comfort and solace and provide structure
and order during times of crisis and disorder.97  Roadside memorials
are often in addition to a traditional interment, rather than a substi-
tute for one.98  And while the deceased are interred elsewhere, for
some families the roadside memorial is the main and immediate locus
for remembering the loved one.99  The proliferation of roadside memo-
rials is evidence that this form of remembrance meets an important
human need.100
Modern culture tends to minimize and deritualize bereavement
practices, such that these bereavement rituals have now “deteriorated
in meaning.”101  Scholars posit that this deritualization and deteriora-
tion has “led to insufficient grieving and inadequate resolution of
92. Clark, supra note 33, at 29–30. R
93. Id. at 30.
94. Gibson, supra note 35, at 150. R
95. Clark, supra note 33, at 27–28 (“The memorials serve as an expression of resent- R
ment and resistance to the apparent random inevitability and anonymity of con-
tinuing road trauma.”); Clark & Franzmann, supra note 4, at 594 R
(“Memorialization, may, in fact, be part of a fight against the depersonalizing
process of modernization and urbanization.”); Robert James Smith, Roadside Me-
morials—Some Australian Examples, 110 FOLKLORE 103, 103–04 (1999) (“In es-
sence, this [roadside memorial] is an attempt to declare and maintain a public
grief against the seeming anonymity and erasure of most highway deaths.”).
96. See Haney et al., supra note 4, at 169. R
97. Haney et al., supra note 4, at 160; Bronna D. Romanoff & Marion Terenzio, Ritu- R
als and the Grieving Process, 22 DEATH STUD. 697, 698 (1998).
98. Dickinson & Hoffmann, supra note 9, at 155; MacKenzie Scott, Roadside Crosses: R
Personal Shrines in Public Places, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, July 12, 2011, at 11.
99. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 230; Everett, supra note 3, at 96; Reid & Reid, R
supra note 3, at 351. R
100. See E´MILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE 4 (Mark S.
Cladis ed., Carol Cosman trans., Oxford University Press, World Classics 2001)
(1912) (“[W]e must reach beneath the symbol to the reality it embodies and which
gives it its true meaning.  The most barbarous or bizarre rituals and the
strangest myths translate some human need, some aspect of life, whether indi-
vidual or social.”).
101. See Romanoff & Terenzio, supra note 97, at 699. See also Haney et al., supra note
4, at 168 (“Since most death in America is controllable and invisible, grieving R
logically follows the same norms.”).
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 74 Side A      08/28/2013   10:13:22
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 74 Side A      08/28/2013   10:13:22
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\92-1\NEB105.txt unknown Seq: 16 27-AUG-13 10:54
2013] PRIVATE MEMORIALS ON PUBLIC SPACE 139
grief.”102  Current bereavement practices are often “one-time events,”
which fail to honor and support a grieving process that extends be-
yond the one-time funeral ritual.103  Modern practices allow time off
from work only for certain family members and only for limited peri-
ods of time.104  Social convention does not expect mourning displays
beyond these relatives or beyond these prescribed times.  Indeed,
scholars have observed that “[p]sychiatric care may be recommended
for those who fail to contain their grieving within these restric-
tions.”105  Modern practices also abandon older traditions like wearing
mourning dress or paying respects to the deceased in the family’s par-
lor room.106  Scholars criticize that our contemporary bereavement
practices are “often inauthentic,” “hollow and rigid,” and “devoid of an
opportunity for genuine healing.”107
These modern, abbreviated funeral rituals may be effective for
some, especially when a death comes later in life, or after an illness,
because the bereaved have had some opportunity to pre-grieve.108
However, contemporary grieving rituals are inadequate for a death
that is sudden, unanticipated, or violent or is the death of a child.109
For these types of deaths, researchers have found that the grieving
process is “likely to be prolonged, with mourners reporting high dis-
tress, disorganization, and active grieving for many years following
the loss.”110  For many mourners of a “bad death,” the contemporary
funeral rituals are insufficient because unexpected deaths often vio-
late and shatter a mourner’s expectations of the world.111
New, supplementary rituals may be necessary to aid in the griev-
ing process.112  Spontaneous memorials erected on the “last alive”
place at the roadside are an example of an emerging ritual that helps
satisfy this need in the grieving process.113  The physical objects or
mementos left at a roadside memorial can come to symbolize the de-
ceased, and the tokens can contain multiple meanings that represent
the mourner’s relationship with the deceased.114  Mourners can main-
102. Romanoff & Terenzio, supra note 97, at 699 (citations omitted); cf. Haney et al.,
supra note 4, at 161 (“When effective responses to crises become ritualized, their R
very familiarity brings about a feeling of comfort and empowerment.”).
103. Romanoff & Terenzio, supra note 97, at 699.
104. Haney et al., supra note 4, at 168. R
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Romanoff & Terenzio, supra note 97, at 699 (citations omitted).
108. See id. at 700–02.
109. Id. at 704 (describing a death that “challenge[s] core assumptive structures”).
110. Id. at 705 (citations omitted).
111. Id.
112. Haney et al., supra note 4, at 161 (noting the creation of a spontaneous memorial R
“does not replace traditional funerary rites”).
113. Id.
114. Romanoff & Terenzio, supra note 97, at 705.
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tain a relationship with the deceased through these objects or me-
mentos.  These tokens become an extension of the self,115 and often
suggest there is an ongoing interaction with the deceased.116  Scholars
who have studied the phenomenon of roadside memorials confirm that
“[w]hen personal items are included in the memorial (toys, sports
equipment, favorite snacks, CDs, etc.) there is a strong suggestion
that the builders are seeking to create a sense of continuity, to emo-
tionally sustain the deceased in their own lives.”117
These objects, according to grief counselor Peter Poses, are “con-
tainers for feelings of loss and sadness” and help to make people “feel
secure, feel at home away from home.”118  According to Poses, leaving
these objects at a memorial “represents an attempt to contain the
madness of the situation.”119  These offerings help the bereaved main-
tain a connection with the deceased.120  Maintaining this connection
with the deceased during the grieving process often leads to a sense of
control over events and feelings, and eventually closure of the
process.121
These roadside memorials aid in the grieving process of the loss of
ordinary individuals, who are neither heroes nor martyrs.122  Memori-
als are erected for people going about their daily lives, rather than
people who have done great deeds.123  There appears to be a growing
urge to memorialize ordinary life in public and expressive ways.
Roadside memorials are part of what American studies Professor Er-
115. DEBORAH LUPTON, THE EMOTIONAL SELF 43 (1998) (“Material objects can generate
emotional responses . . . . [T]hey are possessed of a certain agency or capacity to
act within and shape social relations and perceptions. Social interaction with and
through material forms tends to destabilize subject/object boundaries such that
material objects can become extensions of the body and therefore of
personhood.”).
116. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 228. R
117. Id. at 235.  A similar phenomenon can be seen at other memorial sites like the
Vietnam War Memorial; Place de l’Alma tunnel in Paris, where Princess Diana
was fatally injured; and the fence around the blast site at the federal building in
Oklahoma City. See Edward T. Linenthal, Memory, Memorial, and the
Oklahoma City Bombing, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 6, 1998, at B4, B5 (“For
many survivors and family members of victims, the fence [that surrounded the
blast site around the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City be-
came] a place to talk with the dead.”).
118. Rebecca Jones, Mourning Glory When Tragedy Strikes, Grief Hits the Road in
Mini-Shrines, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, April 22, 1998, at 8D, available at 1998
WLNR 839571.
119. Id.
120. Romanoff & Terenzio, supra note 97, at 707 (“[F]or many bereaved, there is a
need to maintain an ongoing psychic connection with the deceased . . . .”).
121. Id. at 706.
122. Everett, supra note 29 (thesis at 23) (noting that on public roadways across the R
country, “an increasing number of sanctified spaces [are] created in memory of
individuals who were neither well-known nor martyrs”).
123. Clark, supra note 33, at 39. R
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ika Doss calls “memorial mania,” or the “contemporary obsession with
issues of memory and history and an urgent, excessive desire to ex-
press, or claim, those issues in visibly public contexts.”124  This mania
is evidence of a culture that is anxious about its relationship with
time, history, and memory.125  MacKenzie Scott, pastor of First Bap-
tist Church in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, echoes this view: “A tradi-
tional cemetery, with its balance of individual grave and collective
location, may simply seem too impersonal in a world that has become
anxious about personal freedoms.”126
When interviewed, memorial makers often have a hard time fully
articulating what need animates their desire to make memorials or
their purpose in making them.127  Memorial makers reject the sugges-
tion that a memorial is a means of gaining closure, and instead, many
indicate that it is a way of maintaining continuity with the de-
ceased.128  Ongoing mourning and remembrance is evidenced by
maintenance of the memorial site.  Some memorials are carefully and
lovingly maintained for years,129 suggesting that rather than “saying
good-bye” or “letting go,” the bereaved continue to relate to the de-
ceased through these memorials.130
Geography professors Charles Collins and Charles Rhine have
studied this phenomenon and confirm, “More than anything else, the
avowed purpose of the memorial is to keep the deceased’s memory
alive.”131  But then it is unclear why this redundancy is necessary—
the memorial service and burial in a cemetery are intended to do just
that.132  Perhaps the answer is linked to the way we handle death in
modern society.133  Scholars and researchers are still working out why
124. ERIKA DOSS, THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC MEMORIALS: TO-
WARDS A THEORY OF TEMPORARY MEMORIALS 7 (2008).  Professor Doss notes these
“[c]ontemporary acts, rituals, or performances of memorialization are often exor-
bitant, frenzied, and extreme—or manic.” Id.
125. Bednar, supra note 2, at 136. R
126. Scott, supra note 98, at 12.  Pastor Scott also observes, “Perhaps the proliferation
of crosses along the byways is another instance of the dream of getting off the
grid and defying the stifling conventions of civilization.” Id.
127. Clark & Franzmann, supra note 4, at 594–95; Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at R
232.
128. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 235. R
129. Gibson, supra note 35, at 157. R
130. Reid & Reid, supra note 3, at 353. See also Dickinson & Hoffmann, supra note 9, R
at 155 (“A roadside marker located ‘outside’ the cemetery may allow the deceased
to continue to exist in the world of the living.”).
131. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 234. R
132. Id.
133. Kennerly, supra note 33, at 243 (“[T]he proliferation of roadside shrines through- R
out the United States may have more to do with the often contested behaviors
related to death, remembrance, travel, and protection that link individuals to
communities than with any particular religious practice.”).
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 75 Side B      08/28/2013   10:13:22
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 75 Side B      08/28/2013   10:13:22
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\92-1\NEB105.txt unknown Seq: 19 27-AUG-13 10:54
142 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:124
some bereaved feel the need to build these roadside memorials.134
Nevertheless, mourners have shown a willingness to assert their own
moral authority to build and maintain them, irrespective of public
opinion or legal authorization.135
In an era of declining religiosity, these memorials may offer mean-
ing and solace in very personal and unique ways.136  Waning reliance
on established, church-based rituals is evidenced by a worldwide de-
cline in mainstream church membership and attendance.137  Scholars
have noted that memorial makers often report dissatisfaction with
conventional religious practices.138  Perhaps in response to this dis-
satisfaction, there is an emerging rise in the individual’s own spiritual
authority.139  Roadside memorials reflect this trend and attest to the
growth of personalized rituals.140  These memorials have a “pagan,
do-it-yourself element” that some contemporary mourners find satisfy-
ing.141  Roadside memorials are a complex and multivocal phenome-
non.  Individually, the roadside memorial communicates a
multilayered message of remembrance and warning.  Collectively, the
phenomenon communicates a critique against modernity—modern
transportation, modern culture, modern death practices, and modern
religion.
134. Clark & Franzmann, supra note 4, at 594–95. R
135. Id. (“[M]emorial makers are prepared to assume their own authority to build,
maintain and defend roadside memorials and . . . this authority taking can explic-
itly challenge the role of the government and bypass the church as the prime
social purveyors and mediators of grief rituals.”).
136. Id. at 583, 595.
137. Id. at 583; Alasdair Crockett & David Voas, Generations of Decline: Religious
Change in 20th-Century Britain, 45 J. FOR SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 567 (2006)
(examining continuous decline of religion throughout the 20th century in Brit-
ain); C. Kirk Hadaway et al., Overreporting Church Attendance in America: Evi-
dence that Demands the Same Verdict, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 122 (1998) (confirming
decline in weekly attendance at religious services in the United States).
138. Clark & Franzmann, supra note 4, at 583 (“Those who construct memorials now R
often speak of not finding meaning in the rituals of conventional religion and see
their memorials either as an alternative or even in outright opposition to conven-
tional religion.”); Kennerly, supra note 33, at 251 (“Some shrine builders com- R
plain that church services were conducted by clerics who did not have a personal
relationship with the deceased or the family, noting that the liturgy and ritual
were devoid of meaning in the face of their sudden and traumatic loss.”).
139. Clark & Franzmann, supra note 4, at 582. R
140. Clark & Franzmann, supra note 4, at 583 (“The modern construction of roadside R
memorials may be a specific expression, perhaps, of a bigger phenomenon, a cur-
rent groundswell of disregarding institutional forms that once sufficed for the
crisis moments of life.  More than ever, people are beginning to take religion and
meaning-making out of the hands of the government or established religious
[sic].”); Dickinson & Hoffmann, supra note 9, at 155 (“Today’s commemorative R
sites represent a shift in the way that western societies regard death, funerals,
and mourning rituals; death-negating practices seem to gradually give way to
greater expressiveness in public mourning.”).
141. Clark & Franzmann, supra note 4, at 593 (citation omitted). R
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III. PUBLIC OPINION AND PUBLIC POLICY ON
ROADSIDE MEMORIALS
A. Public Opinion on Roadside Memorials
The proliferation of roadside memorials poses a problem for public
officials, who are in an ongoing quandary concerning how to balance
traffic safety and the aesthetic interests of the community with the
grieving process of the bereaved.142  Balancing the interests of road
safety and maintenance, visual blight, and Establishment Clause con-
cerns with the needs of the grieving is “a public relations
minefield.”143  Roadside memorials have been a source of controversy
and debate in both the United States144 and in other countries around
the world.145
Public opinion is mixed about whether roadside memorials should
be permitted or not.146  The public is generally deferential to roadside
memorials that have been erected,147 even if the public does not fully
share the memorial maker’s sense of sacredness of the site.148  And
142. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 222. R
143. Id. at 226.  “[E]nforcement efforts become a public relations disaster, especially if
memorial builders choose to take their plight to the public via the media.” Id. at
241.
144. See, e.g., Dickinson & Hoffmann, supra note 9, at 156 (“[T]he placement of crosses R
on public property has been controversial in a number of American states.”); Rob-
ert Tiernan et al., Should Roadside Memorials Be Banned?, N.Y. TIMES (July 12,
2009, 7:00 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/should-road-
side-memorials-be-banned/.
145. Clark, supra note 33, at 38. R
146. Professor Richard Tay explained his mixed survey findings and concluded that
“[o]verall, public support for roadside memorials is divided but leaning more to-
wards allowing than disallowing them.”  Tay, supra note 49, at 666.  Tay R
continues:
The single most popular option is the strict no roadside memorial policy.
Therefore, it is tempting to conclude that a policy that does not allow
roadside memorials should be adopted. However, this view is preferred
by only 30.5% of the respondents. In addition to this group, 7.9% of the
respondents also selected the unofficially disallow option. Together,
these two choices were preferred by 38.4% of the respondents.  On the
other hand, the share of respondents who chose officially allow, allow
with standardised [sic] memorials and unofficially allow amounted to
51.0% of all the respondents.  Therefore, it would appear that a relative
bigger share of the public was in support of allowing roadside memorials.
The remaining 10.6% of the respondents opted to allow only under spe-
cial circumstances or allow on a case-by-case basis.
Id.
147. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 241 (“With a few vocal exceptions, the public R
seems either to respect the right of families and friends to act in this fashion, or
to be willing to ignore the issue.”).
148. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 232 (“[T]he attitude of most in the general pub- R
lic is respect, though it probably stops short of sharing a sense that these sites are
sacred in any conventional definition of that attribution.”); Tay, supra note 49, at R
664 (surveying college-aged drivers and finding most drivers support allowing
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while generally deferential to extant memorials, when polled about
prospective memorials, the public’s response is ambivalent. When
asked in the abstract how long any roadside memorial should be al-
lowed to remain erected, public opinion is divided between those pre-
ferring to allow a memorial to remain for an unlimited amount of time
and those preferring not to allow the memorials to be erected at all.149
Additionally, public opinion concerning whether roadside memorials
are a distraction to drivers is also divided between those who find
them distracting and those who find them a reminder to drive more
carefully.150
While roadside memorials can be deeply meaningful and healing
for the mourners, some observers object to the sanctification of public
roadsides.  Those who voice criticism suggest that the roadside memo-
rials are “disingenuous” or “personal propaganda,” the makers are
“faking it for attention,” or the memorial is a “pious form of litter-
ing.”151  As an illustration of such criticism, Benjamin Radford, man-
aging editor of the Skeptical Inquirer magazine, asks: “If an old
woman dies while shopping in a supermarket, should her family sue to
erect a memorial to her in aisle 12 next to the soups?  Or in the park-
ing lot?”152  Radford then observes, “Thousands of people die each day
in the United States.  Each one of those people had families, friends,
hopes, and dreams.  Yet we do not erect public memorials for them.  Is
a death from a car crash any more significant (or worthy of memorial)
than any other death?”153
Memorials on public spaces are situated to draw in strangers to
share in the grieving process.154  Some memorials are clearly visible
and are intended to be seen,155 while others are more personal and
roadside memorials but that they also preferred standardized or official
memorials).
149. Tay, supra note 49, at 666 (“With respect to time limit, no limit was chosen by the R
largest percentage (26.0%) of the respondents, followed closely by no time at all
(24.9%).  Between these extremes, 49.1% preferred to have some time limit im-
posed on roadside memorials, with 1 month (19.2%) being most popular limit,
followed by 1 week (11.5%).”).
150. Id. (“In terms of self-reported effects on actual driving behaviour [sic], 46.8% re-
ported that the presence of roadside memorials was likely to distract them while
they were driving; 39.1% reported that roadside memorials made them think
about their driving, and 32.1% reported that roadside memorials made them
drive more cautiously.”).
151. Kennerly, supra note 33, at 245. R
152. Benjamin Radford, Religion on the Roadside: Traffic Fatality Markers Generate
Controversy, FREE INQUIRY, Winter 2001/2002, at 59.
153. Id.
154. Clark, supra note 33, at 38 (“[T]he public nature of these memorials allows a R
wider range of people to participate in the grieving process.”).
155. Gibson, supra note 35, at 156 (explaining that for the more visible memorials, R
“[w]hile it is generated out of private grief and memory, its style is nevertheless
performative—it is there to be seen”).
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private.156  Participating in a stranger’s roadside memorial can pro-
mote a sense of group solidarity, “a symbolic coming together of the
community in mourning.”157  Yet, sometimes strangers do not wel-
come being drawn into the grieving process because it brings un-
wanted reminders of death.158  For some, memorials are an
unwelcome testament to the fragile and fleeting nature of life.  These
memorials are powerful reminders of the inherent dangers of driving.
And viewers are reminded of these dangers while driving down the
same roadway where someone else died.159  According to Doug Tin-
dall, a maintenance engineer for the Oregon Department of Transpor-
tation (DOT), his department “regularly receives calls regarding
roadside memorials.  Most callers want displays removed because they
don’t want continual reminders of someone’s death in a traffic acci-
dent.”160  Echoing this sentiment, a resident near a roadside memorial
in Florida wrote an e-mail to the city mayor: “The erection of memori-
als near our home only serves to regularly reinforce our personal pain
each time we turn into the neighborhood.”161   Memorial-making can
be productive and healing for the maker, but the memorial can also
bring unwanted, “vicarious trauma” to other drivers who are forced to
experience it.162
In addition to viewing a memorial as an unwanted reminder of
tragic loss, some individuals see a memorial as a “macabre eye-
sore.”163  Journalist Stephanie Warsmith observed, “The teddy bears
turn soggy and gray.  Flowers wilt.  Handwritten tributes become il-
legible.  Rather than serving as a tribute to someone who died, they
become an eyesore.”164  Some markers deteriorate and disappear,
whereas others are devotedly maintained for years and are redeco-
156. Id. at 157 (“In contrast, other memorials are first and foremost messages of love
to the dead.  They communicate grief in a more intimate way and their public
face is incidental to the death occurring in a publicly visible setting.”).
157. Monger, supra note 89, at 114.
158. Reid & Reid, supra note 3, at 353 (“Some prefer that others’ mourning behavior R
not intrude on them as they travel the roadway.”).
159. Bednar, supra note 2, at 133, 140 (noting “their location on the roadside presup- R
poses that people in automobiles will see them in roadspace . . . .”); Clark &
Franzmann, supra note 4, at 587 (“The non-grieving can see memorials as an R
intrusion upon their space.”).
160. Karen Schmidt, Roadside Memorials Spark Religious Freedom Dispute, CHRISTI-
ANITY TODAY, Apr. 3, 2000, at 20.
161. Memorials Create Dilemma for Cities, SUN SENTINEL, Feb. 25, 2012, at 1A, availa-
ble at 2012 WLNR 4080769.
162. Bednar, supra note 2, at 134 (“As individual shrine builders heal through repeat- R
ing their encounter with the affective memory embodied in the shrine site, they
bring the trauma to the rest of us, giving us an intrusive traumatic memory for
us to work through in a different way.”).
163. Dickinson & Hoffmann, supra note 9, at 156 (citations omitted). R
164. Stephanie Warsmith, Tattered Memorials to Dead Taking Toll in Neighborhoods,
AKRON BEACON J., Oct. 9, 2011, at A1, available at 2011 WLNR 20751801.
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rated on auspicious dates or holidays.165  But once the mourning pro-
cess no longer needs the memorial, it is often neglected.166  And then
it is unclear who, if anyone, will maintain the memorial.167  Roadside
memorials that fall into disuse and disrepair can deteriorate into
blight or clog road drains.168
More than just an issue of aesthetics, roadside memorials raise
concerns about road maintenance and road safety.  These memorials
can interfere with road maintenance and mowing operations.169  Me-
mentos left at roadside memorials can become hazardous projectiles
when tall grass is mowed.170  Roadside memorials can also pose a
safety hazard to other drivers.171  Sociology professors George Dickin-
son and Heath Hoffmann, who surveyed state DOT officials, found
that 70% of officials said roadside memorials were considered a safety
hazard in their state.172  An Arizona DOT spokesperson reported that
of the 4,000 rear-end collisions that occurred in a year, “a troubling
number involved drivers who stopped to view roadside memorials.”173
In Wyoming, the DOT considers roadside memorials dangerous and
cited an accident where the death of a child was attributed to a driver
who was distracted by a memorial for two young pedestrians killed
earlier at the same site.174  And in Texas, a young woman was struck
165. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 235. R
166. See Gibson, supra note 35, at 158. R
167. Smith, supra note 95, at 105 (“Still, one wonders if there will be a gradual decline
of the practice at individual sites after several years, once the memorialisation
[sic] has served its purpose—in the same way that the number of flowers on a
grave decreases over the years.”).
168. Clark & Franzmann, supra note 4, at 585; Everett, supra note 29 (thesis at 89); R
Reid & Reid, supra note 3, at 350. R
169. Everett, supra note 29 (thesis at 57) (“The [roadside memorial] assemblages have R
become so numerous as to render routine roadway maintenance difficult.”).
170. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 236 (“Plainly, any structure placed on the mar- R
gins of a road hinder or complicate its maintenance. This is especially true of
mowing operations along highways. Wood or metal crosses, stones, bits of decora-
tive fencing, even votive candles and teddy bears interfere with normal proce-
dures. Likewise, on private lands, especially in fields, memorials obstruct normal
crop cultivation and harvesting.”).
171. See, e.g., Friends Upset WSDOT Removed Roadside Memorial (KING 5 News
Broadcast Apr. 2, 2012), available at http://www.king5.com/news/local/Friends-
upset-WSDOT-removed-roadside-memorial-145784275.html) (“WSDOT said it
was becoming a hazard because other drivers were slowing down to look at it [the
memorial cross] along Interstate 405.”).
172. Dickinson & Hoffman, supra note 9, at 161. R
173. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 238. R
174. Chris Ross, supra note 66, at 52; cf. Daniella Miletic, Roadside Tributes Blamed
for Fatal Crash, AGE (Australia), July 11, 2009, at 3, available at 2009 WLNR
27592896 (“Police believe the two-week-old shrine made for the teenagers killed
at the intersection . . . distracted 21-year-old Melissa I’Anson, who died when her
car was hit by a B-double truck . . . [as she] slowed down to look at the messages
as she turned right at the intersection.”).
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and killed by a car while she was visiting the roadside memorial of her
cousin following the cousin’s funeral.175
In light of experiences like these, some state officials have concerns
about the safety hazards posed by roadside memorials.176  However,
the traffic safety researchers who have examined the hazards posed
by these memorials have found them to be generally safety-neutral.
Two studies report no statistically significant effect from roadside me-
morials.177  And one study found that while drivers were less likely to
run through red lights at intersections with roadside memorials,178
the researcher warned that such memorials could raise “other safety
concerns, including potential hazards to pedestrians, cyclists and
maintenance workers.”179  Professor Tay, a traffic safety expert, also
cautions that leaving roadside memorials completely unregulated
could raise safety concerns because “[w]ithout some forms of restric-
tions in place, some memorials erected may become a potential hazard
due to their size and materials used.”180
While scientific data on the effects of roadside memorials is still
emerging, there is a body of research on the effects of roadside adver-
tisements.  Researchers have found street-level advertisements, such
as those on the side of a bus stop, pose a greater hazard than raised-
level advertisements, such as a billboard.181  Street-level advertise-
ments hold drivers’ attention longer because of their location within
the “cluttered areas of the visual scene” where drivers are attending to
175. Reid & Reid, supra note 3, at 352–53. See also Everett, supra note 29 (thesis at R
57) (“Additionally, TxDOT [Texas Department of Transportation] officials fear
they are dangerously distracting to drivers.”).
176. See Anthony Edward Churchill, Roadside Memorials and Traffic Safety 43 (Au-
gust 2007) (unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Calgary) (on file with author)
(“Municipalities’ chief concerns are distraction [of drivers] and the perception
that roadside memorials are safety hazards.”).
177. Tay, et al. supra note 49, at 484–86 (finding roadside memorials did not have any R
significant effect on speeding and following too closely, however, no positive ef-
fects on safety were found either); Churchill, supra note 176 (thesis at 92) (“The
effects of memorials on traffic behaviour [sic] in both the study of short and long
term effects have been shown to be statistically insignificant.”).  Moreover, per-
sonal roadside memorials are unlikely to provide an effective cautionary or salu-
tary effect on drivers: “The finding that roadside memorials do not affect driver
speed or following distance suggests that use of conventional roadside memorials
as a safety countermeasure for speed or following distance issues is unlikely to be
effective.” Id. at 93.
178. Tay, supra note 49, at 669 (“The number of red light violations in a 6-week period R
at selected intersections after the installation of the roadside memorials was
found to be significantly lower (16.7%) than the violation rates in the 6-week pe-
riod before the installation of the roadside memorials.”).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. David Crundall et al., Attraction and Distraction of Attention with Roadside Ad-
vertisements, 38 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 671, 671–77 (2006).
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other street objects and passing cars.182  Researchers have found that
when drivers have more visual clutter to filter through, it takes them
longer to process and make sense of the traffic landscape.183  Addi-
tionally, clutter narrows the observer’s useful field of view and in-
creases the amount of time needed to process the information in
view.184  Street-level advertisements may also hold drivers’ attention
longer than raised-level advertisements because drivers are less com-
fortable averting their eyes from the roadway for prolonged
glances.185  As a corollary, drivers may be able to process raised-level
advertisements with shorter glances than street-level advertisements
because there is less visual clutter to contend with when a billboard is
viewed against the sky or buildings.186  Researchers have also found
that older drivers process cluttered traffic scenes more slowly and less
accurately than younger drivers.187  And with an aging population of
drivers, state governments have legitimate concerns about driver dis-
traction and road hazards.188
182. Id. at 676.
183. Theo Boersema et al., Conspicuity in Realistic Scenes: An Eye-Movement Mea-
sure, 20 APPLIED ERGONOMICS 267, 267–73 (1998) (suggesting longer latencies for
high-clutter scenes resulted from a greater number of fixations needed to locate a
target).
184. Toshiaki Miura, Active Function of Eye Movement and Useful Field of View, in a
Realistic Setting in FROM EYE TO MIND: INFORMATION ACQUISITION IN PERCEP-
TION, SEARCH, & READING 119, 119–27 (Rudolf Groner et al., eds., 1990); Cynthia
Owsley et al., Visual/Cognitive Correlates of Vehicle Accidents in Older Drivers, 6
PSYCHOL. & AGING 403, 403–15 (1991).
185. Crundall, supra note 181, at 676 (“The greater the distance between the fixation
on an advertisement and the road ahead, the greater the impulse to return the
eyes to the forward position as soon as possible.  As RSAs [raised-level advertise-
ments] are further away from the optimum fixation position than SLAs [street-
level advertisements], it is natural that drivers will tend to fixate RSAs for a
shorter amount of time.”).
186. Id.
187. Geoffrey Ho et al., Visual Search for Traffic Signs: The Effects of Clutter, Lumi-
nance, and Aging, 43 HUMAN FACTORS 194, 205 (2001) (“Older adults were slower
and less accurate and required more fixations to acquire a traffic sign.”).
188. Id. at 205 (“This suggests that in time-limited situations that involve visually
complex scenes (e.g., a busy intersection), older adults are more likely than
younger adults to misidentify a sign or miss a sign altogether. The driving popu-
lation is aging rapidly.”).  In light of this scholarship, traffic safety researchers
suggest that “roadway engineers should consider reducing the number of compet-
ing signs (e.g., advertisements), avoiding redundant signs, and making traffic
signs that are central to the safety of the driver more conspicuous.” Id.
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B. Patchwork of Public Policies on Roadside Memorials
State and local governments across the country have adopted a
patchwork of policies and regulations for roadside memorials.189
Policymakers struggle to balance the needs of the bereaved and the
needs of the community.  Many governments are considering appro-
priate limits on roadside displays as a way to balance these needs.190
Nearly half of the states have adopted some policy regarding the
placement of roadside memorials.191  Policies vary widely with some
states expressly permitting private markers, some allowing only
state-sponsored markers, some having no express policy, and some ex-
pressly prohibiting all private roadside markers—yet often not enforc-
ing the prohibition.
States like Alaska,192 Virginia,193 and Texas194 expressly permit
private memorials.  Traffic-related fatalities in Texas may be com-
memorated by a marker that is “no more than 30 inches high and no
wider than 18 inches” and is located in a place that “does not distract
motorists.”195  The Texas DOT “Use of Right of Way by Others Man-
ual” includes a sketch that illustrates the size and construction limita-
tions for right of way markers; the sample marker is a 30” x 18” Latin
cross.
189. Michael Risinit, Displays Help With Grief; Some Call Them Depressing, Unsafe,
J. NEWS (Weschester, N.Y.), June 2, 2004, A1, available at 2004 WLNR 23055889
(noting “regulations nationwide are a hodgepodge of do’s and don’ts”).
190. Hannah Dreier, East Contra Costa Agency to Crack Down on Roadside Memori-
als, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Apr. 15, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 7458502 (“Na-
tionwide, states and cities are grappling with roadside memorials as they become
more common.  Though some local agencies have placed restrictions on memori-
als, it’s unusual to ban them outright.”). See Cara Hogan, Hampstead Proposes
Roadside Memorial Ordinance, EAGLE-TRIB., Dec. 27, 2010, available at 2010
WLNR 25455635; Jo Ann Hustis, Lasting Memories, MORRIS DAILY HERALD, Aug.
25, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 16829809; Neil Johnson, Roadside Memorial
for Man Sparks Controversy, JANESVILLE GAZETTE, Jan. 16, 2012, available at
2012 WLNR 1024690; Memorials Create Dilemma for Cities, supra note 161;
Warsmith, supra note 164, at A1; Sam Wheeler, Signs of Remembrance, ASHLAND
DAILY TIDINGS, Aug. 21, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 17417056.
191. Dickinson & Hoffmann, supra note 9, at 158 (identifying that 23 states, or 46%, R
have adopted a policy).
192. ALASKA STAT. § 19.25.260 (2010); DEP’T OF TRANSP. & PUB. FACILITIES, STATE OF
ALASKA, A PRIMER FOR ROADSIDE MEMORIALS, available at http://www.dot.alaska.
gov/stwddes/dcsrow/assets/pdf/roadsidememorials.pdf.
193. 24 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 30-151-550 (2012); VA. DEP’T OF TRANSP., GUIDELINES FOR
ROADSIDE MEMORIALS (2006), available at http://www.virginiadot.org/business/re-
sources/NOVA_FairfaxPermits/FairfaxPermits_RoadsideMemorialGuidelines.
pdf.
194. TEX. DEP’T OF TRANSP., USE OF RIGHT OF WAY BY OTHERS MANUAL 3-22 to 3-23
(2005), available at http://onlinemanuals.txdot.gov/txdotmanuals/use/use.pdf.
195. Id.
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Figure 1. “Sketch of Typical Marker” from the Texas DOT “Use of
Right of Way by Others Manual.”196
Other states, such as West Virginia197 and South Carolina,198 do
not expressly prohibit private memorials but do offer a state-approved
sign.  In West Virginia a loved one can select a sign with one of three
messages along with the name of the deceased: (1) “Please Drive
Safely”—available for all victims of highway fatalities; (2) “Please
Buckle Up”—available for highway fatalities where the victim was not
wearing a seat belt; and (3) “Don’t Drink and Drive”—available for
victims of a vehicular crash involving alcohol or drugs.199  By offering
official signs, state officials hope the bereaved will opt for the state-
issued sign rather than making their own.200  However, observers
note that it does not appear that the state-sponsored memorial pro-
gram is an adequate substitute for a privately made memorial.201
196. Id. at 3-24.
197. W. VA. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ROADSIDE MEMORIALS, available at http://www.trans-
portation.wv.gov/highways/traffic/roadsidememorials/Pages/default.aspx.
198. S.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ROADSIDE MEMORIAL SIGN, available at http://www.scdot.
org/getting/community_roadside_memorials.aspx.
199. W. VA. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ROADSIDE MEMORIALS, available at http://www.trans-
portation.wv.gov/HIGHWAYS/TRAFFIC/ROADSIDEMEMORIALS/Pages/de-
fault.aspx.
200. Steve Jones, Roadside Signs May Be Tough Sell in S.C., MYRTLE BEACH SUN
NEWS, Aug. 9, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 15813529 (“South Carolina high-
way officials hope the availability of new, state-provided signs at places where
people have died on roadways will cut down on the number of homemade memori-
als along the sides of roads.”).
201. Sales Slow for State’s Roadside Memorials, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, June 1, 2010,
at 9A, available at 2010 WLNR 11413548 (“The state’s [West Virginia] idea of
offering official roadside memorial signs to families of those killed in traffic acci-
dents isn’t catching on with residents.”); see also Craig Schneider, DOT: Make-
shift Tributes Must Go, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 10, 2011, at A1, available at
2011 WLNR 2626628 (reporting that for one bereaved mother in Georgia, a white
state-issued sign was inadequate because it “would not be personal enough”).
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States like Wyoming,202 Colorado,203 Georgia,204 and Florida205
prohibit private memorials, but will erect a state-approved sign to
mark the “last alive” place of a loved one.  In Florida, for example, the
DOT will erect a fifteen-inch round “Drive Safely” marker on state
roads for accident victims, unless local regulations prohibit them.206
States like Illinois,207 New Hampshire,208 California,209 and New
Mexico210 offer state signs only for victims of certain types of traffic
fatalities, such as DUI deaths.211  But accident victims who were
themselves driving while under the influence of alcohol or controlled
substances are ineligible for official memorial signs in states like
Texas,212 South Carolina,213 and Illinois.214  And by participating in
202. WYO. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ROADSIDE MEMORIAL PROGRAM (2003), available at http://
www.dot.state.wy.us/files/content/sites/wydot/files/shared/Public%20Affairs/
Roadside%20Memorial%20Program%20Brochure.pdf; Dan Frosch, Wyoming
Finds a Place for Crash-Site Memorials, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2008, at A21, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/26/world/americas/26iht-wyoming.4.
17256888.html (“Wyoming started enforcing a ban on roadside memorials more
than five years ago, after they began appearing so often that transportation offi-
cials felt they could distract and obstruct drivers in a dangerous way.”).
203. COLO. DEP’T OF TRANSP., SAFETY & TRAFFIC ENGINEERING BRANCH, ROADSIDE ME-
MORIAL SIGNAGE PROGRAM CRITERIA (2009), available at http://www.coloradodot.
info/library/forms/cdot1314.pdf (“Signs may only be installed on State highways.
Signs installed on State highways within a city or town require local government
approval.”).
204. GA. CODE ANN § 32-6-50 (2010); see GA. DEP’T OF TRANSP., MEMORIAL MARKERS,
available at http://www.dot.state.ga.us/doingbusiness/permits/Pages/Memorial
Markers.aspx.
205. FLA. DEP’T OF TRANSP., WELCOME TO THE HIGHWAY SAFETY MEMORIAL MARKER
PROGRAM, available at http://www.dot.state.fl.us/statemaintenanceoffice/memo-
rial%20markers.shtm.
206. Id.
207. ILL. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DUI MEMORIAL SIGN PROGRAM, available at http://www.
dot.il.gov/oper/duimemorialprogram.html. See 605 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/15 and
125/20 (West 2007 & Supp. 2012) (offering a “Please Don’t Drink and Drive”
sign).
208. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 236:48-a (Supp. 2012) (outlining DWI Victim Fatality
Sign Program).
209. CAL. DEP’T OF TRANSP., VICTIMS MEMORIAL SIGN PROGRAM, available at http://
www.dot.ca.gov/hq/traffops/signtech/signdel/victims.htm. See CAL. STS. & HIGH.
CODE § 101.10 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012) (offering a “Please Don’t Drink and
Drive” sign followed by: “In Memory of (deceased victim’s name)” along state
highways).
210. N.M. CODE R. §18.20.7.8 (LexisNexis 2012) (“The standard sign features the
words ‘Please Don’t Drink and Drive’ ‘In memory of (victim’s name(s)).’ ”).
211. In states like Oregon and Utah, roadside sign along state highways are available
to commemorate police officers killed in the line of duty. OR. REV. STAT.
§ 366.930 (2011); OR. ADMIN. R. 734-026-0010 to -0045 (2013); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 72-7-110 (Supp. 2012).
212. 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.953(e) (2013) (determining eligibility for Memorial
Sign Program).
213. S.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ROADSIDE MEMORIAL SIGN, available at http://www.scdot.
org/getting/community_roadside_memorials.aspx.
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the state-approved sign program, mourners in Illinois are expressly
discouraged from augmenting the official memorial with personal
items.215
The cost of the sign and length of time it may remain erected varies
among the states that offer approved signs.  Roadside markers are
free in Florida216 and Wyoming217 but cost up to $350 in Texas218 and
$1,000 in California.219  Roadside markers may stay in place for one
year in Florida;220 two years in Illinois;221 three years in West Vir-
ginia, which is renewable for another three years for $200;222 seven
years in California;223 and the life of the sign in South Dakota.224  In
states like Texas225 and Virginia,226 the memorial sign is offered to
the victim’s family after it is removed from the roadside.  And in New
Mexico it is a misdemeanor to knowingly deface or destroy a roadside
memorial.227
Other states, such as Pennsylvania, Ohio, New York, Rhode Is-
land, and Nebraska do not have an official policy for roadside memori-
als but will remove any marker that poses a safety hazard.228   And in
214. 605 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 125/15(f) (West 2007 & Supp. 2012) (excluding memorial
marker for impaired victim drivers “unless the next of kin of any other victim or
victims killed in the crash consent in writing to the erection of the memorial
marker”).
215. 605 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 125/15(e) (West 2007 & Supp. 2012) (“The qualified rela-
tive shall agree not to place or encourage the placement of flowers, pictures, or
other items at the crash site.”).
216. FLA. DEP’T OF TRANSP., Procedural Document Topic No. 850-050-004-c, HIGHWAY
SAFETY MEMORIAL MARKERS (Mar. 15, 2007), available at  http://www.dot.state.fl.
us/proceduraldocuments/procedures/bin/850050004.pdf (last visited Mar. 13,
2013).
217. WYO. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ROADSIDE MEMORIAL PROGRAM, available at http://www.
dot.state.wy.us/wydot/news_info/roadside_memorials (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
218. 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.952 (2013) (permitting the request of a memorial sign);
43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.954(a) (2013) (setting fee at $350.00).
219. CAL. DEP’T OF TRANSP., VICTIMS MEMORIAL SIGN PROGRAM, available at http://
www.dot.ca.gov/hq/traffops/signtech/signdel/victims.htm (last updated Nov. 16,
2010).
220. FLA. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 205.
221. 605 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 125/20(c) (West 2007 & Supp. 2012).
222. W. VA. CODE R. § 157-6-9.5.i (2012).
223. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 101.10(d)(1) (West 2005 & Supp. 2012).
224. S.D. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, THINK SIGN INFORMATION, available at http://dps.sd.
gov/enforcement/accident_records/think_sign_information.aspx (last visited Mar.
13, 2013).
225. 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.957(c) (2013) (noting the applicant may take posses-
sion of the sign after it has been removed).
226. 24 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 30-151-550(D) (2012) (“After the two-year term . . . the
memorial shall be removed by VDOT personnel [and] [t]he memorial nameplate
will be returned to the applicant or the designated family member . . . .”).
227. N. M. STAT. ANN. § 30-15-7 (Supp. 2012).
228. JoAnne Klimovich Harrop, Roadside Shrines Help Loved Ones Deal With Trag-
edy, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., July 4, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 13421675
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the absence of an official state policy, some states have “guidelines” for
handling roadside memorials,229 and other jurisdictions allow policies
to be enacted and enforced at the local or municipal level.230  In New
Jersey, privately erected memorials may remain along the Atlantic
City Expressway for only ten days, after which the South Jersey
Transportation Authority will remove them.231  Some Florida cities,
such as Boca Raton and Weston, prohibit all memorial markers on city
roads while other cities, such as Tamarac and Parkland, handle inci-
dents on a case-by-case basis.232  The Town of Stoughton, Massachu-
setts, for example, has no official policy on roadside memorials.233
Stoughton Police Department’s spokesman Robert Devine says, “Over
time, they [roadside memorials] usually get taken down once they
start getting in rough shape.”234  Moreover, he notes, “I think you’d be
hard-pressed to find a town that has a specific bylaw. Usually it’s just
a matter of decorum, and once some time passes to heal, it gets cleared
up.”235
As an alternative to a roadside memorial sign, Delaware offers a
“green memorial” that allows a tree, bush, or garden to be planted in
(“While there is no law against erecting roadside memorials, PennDOT District
11 spokesman Jim Struzzi says there is kind of an unwritten procedure.
‘PennDOT is certainly sympathetic to the needs of the family and friends when it
comes to roadside memorials,’ he says. ‘We would prefer not to see them, but
conversely, we appreciate what they mean to people. We would say, if they want
to erect them, that they keep in mind where they are erecting the roadside memo-
rial so as not to be distracting to drivers.’”); Perry Brothers, Crosses Relay
Messages, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 8, 1999, at A1, available at 1999 WLNR
8445925; Warsmith, supra note 164, at A1 (“The Ohio Department of Transporta- R
tion doesn’t permit memorials, but allows them to remain as long as they don’t
pose a hazard or draw away drivers’ attention. When the state does maintenance
work, such as mowing, memorials in the way are removed, said Justin Chesnic, a
spokesman for the department’s District 4.”).
229. Dickinson & Hoffmann, supra note 9, at 158 (“Two other states (Iowa and Minne- R
sota) reported not having a policy but included with their returned survey a
‘statement’ or ‘guidelines’ that spelled out how private memorials would be han-
dled in the absence of state legislation.”); Schneider, supra note 201, at A1 (not-
ing Georgia cities and counties regulate their own roadways and thus set their
own roadside memorials policies).
230. Schneider, supra note 201, at A1 (“Five of those states with a policy also said that
‘counties, cities, or precincts’ in their state have their own regulations regarding
roadside memorials and four additional states without an official state policy in-
dicate that counties, cities, or other jurisdictions have their own policies.”). See
also Reid & Reid, supra note 3, at 351 (noting that in states like Texas, “enforce- R
ment practices vary from county to county”).
231. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 19:2-5.10(c) (2013).
232. Memorials Create Dilemma for Cities, supra note 161, at 1A.
233. Erin Shannon, How Long Is Too Long for Roadside Memorials?, PATRIOT LEDGER,
Oct. 9, 2012, at 8, available at 2012 WLNR 21512743.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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the vicinity of a highway fatality.236  In states like Utah,237 Mis-
souri,238 and Wisconsin,239 mourners are encouraged to participate in
the Adopt-A-Highway roadside cleanup program and use the program
sign as a memorial to the loved one.  David Vieth, Wisconsin’s bureau
of highway operations director, says, “Wisconsin isn’t just concerned
that the memorials are a distraction for drivers whizzing by.  Officials
also worry about the potential safety hazard when mourners stop to
visit the memorials, often just a few feet off the interstate.”240
Roadside memorials are prohibited as an obstruction or encroach-
ment of a highway in states like Indiana,241 Iowa,242 Montana,243 and
North Dakota.244  But these laws are often not enforced.245  In states
where erecting roadside memorials is prohibited, public officials often
turn a blind eye to memorials out of respect.246  Journalist Chris Ross
notes that “in probably no other area of public life does practice di-
verge so dramatically from official policy.”247
236. Mike Chalmers, States Seek Alternatives to Roadside Memorials, USA TODAY,
June 4, 2010, at 3A, available at 2010 WLNR 11439853.
237. UTAH DEP’T OF TRANSP., POLICY FOR ROADSIDE MEMORIALS (2005), available at
http://www.udot.utah.gov/main/uconowner.gf?n=10465114960298226.
238. Memorial Designation Programs, MO. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.modot.org/
services/MemorialDesignationPrograms.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
239. WIS. DEP’T OF TRANSP., REMEMBERING A LOVED ONE: MEMORIALS ON STATE HIGH-
WAYS (2012), available at http://www.dot.wisconsin.gov/business/rules/docs/road-
side.pdf. See also Crosses to Bear, PROVIDENCE J. BULL., Oct. 23, 2005, at A1,
available at 2005 WLNR 17261982 (“Relatives of the deceased can adopt a two-
mile section of highway and have a standard sign erected there in the name of the
deceased. But they must also agree to clean their section of roadway at least
three times a year.”).
240. J.R. Ross, States Eye Bans on Roadside Memorials: Officials Fear the Shrines
Will Be a Distraction to Other Motorists and May Cause More Accidents, GRAND
RAPIDS PRESS, July 13, 2003, at F8, available at 2003 WLNR 13842930.
241. IND. CODE ANN. § 9-21-4-6 (West 2012).
242. IOWA CODE ANN. § 318.3(7) (West 2012).
243. MONT. CODE ANN. § 60-6-101 (2011) (prohibiting encroachments on the right of
way for state highways); MONT. DEP’T OF  TRANSP., MONT. RIGHT OF WAY OPERA-
TIONS MANUAL ch. 7 (2007) (defining encroachments), available at http://www.
mdt.mt.gov/other/rw/external/manual/chapter_7.pdf.
244. N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-03-23 (2002).
245. Robert Medley, Heaven Begins at Roadside Crosses, OKLAHOMAN, April 29, 2012,
at 21A, available at 2012 WLNR 9136664; Seth Seymour, Roadside Memorials
Against Law; However, State Is Sympathetic, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR,
July 12, 2005, at 8, available at 2005 WLNR 12830393.
246. Dreier, supra note 190 (“Roadside memorials technically violate the law because
they are on public property, but they are often untouched because of their sensi-
tive nature.”); Memorials Create Dilemma for Cities, supra note 161, at 1A (“Cit-
ies across Florida have rules for regulating the erection or duration of roadside
memorial markers.  But some don’t follow them, to avoid the delicate and emo-
tional issue of taking down a marker in memory of somebody who was killed.”).
247. Ross, supra note 66, at 50; accord Schneider, supra note 201, at A1 (“They are
already prohibited under state law, and many are removed as workers cut the
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Scholars have found a common theme of deference among DOT of-
ficials, who try to balance safety concerns while simultaneously re-
specting a family’s need to grieve for the loved one.248  State officials
are generally sensitive to the grief of the loved ones and show a great
deal of deference to the memorials, notwithstanding any official pol-
icy.249  In states where roadside memorials are illegal, authorities
often leave the memorials in place unless a complaint is lodged.250
These local agencies take the unofficial stance of acknowledging the
need for individuals to grieve and leave most memorials undis-
turbed.251  Professor of communication studies Rebecca Kennerly,
who has extensively studied roadside memorials, explains that these
shrines are typically “granted a certain ‘grace’ insofar as they are con-
sidered spontaneous expressions of grief and therefore authentic and
above reproach.”252
IV. ROADSIDE MEMORIALS AND THE FREE
SPEECH CLAUSE
Roadside memorials serve as a powerful signifier of death and
space.  And while these symbols do not lend themselves to a single
message or meaning,253 they undoubtedly serve an important expres-
sive function for the loved ones of the deceased.254  The memorial
speaks as much for the memorial maker as it does the loved one who is
memorialized by reflecting the maker’s image of the loved one.255  But
grass and pick up litter along the roadways.  But workers often leave the memori-
als for a time in deference to family and friends.”).
248. Dickinson & Hoffmann, supra note 9, at 161; Kennerly, supra note 33, at 244 R
(“Despite federal and state laws, local government agencies responsible for safety
and maintenance of public roads often indicate a reluctance to remove roadside
shrines.”).
249. Dickinson & Hoffmann, supra note 9, at 163; Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at R
236.
250. Dickinson & Hoffmann, supra note 9, at 161; Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at R
237.
251. Kennerly, supra note 33, at 244. R
252. Id. at 251.  This “grace” is also reflected in the policy statement from various
state agencies.  For example, Arizona’s Historic Preservation Specialists ac-
knowledge that while “Roadside Memorials are not considered historic proper-
ties,” Arizona DOT treats these memorials “with respect for the families that
install and maintain the memorials.” ENVTL. PLANNING GROUP., ARIZ. DEP’T OF
TRANSP., HISTORIC PRESERVATION HANDBOOK 69–70 (2008), available at
www.azdot.gov/highways/EPG/EPG_Common/Docs/Technical/Cultural_HPT_
Handbook.doc.  And Alaska’s “Primer for Roadside Memorials” starts with the
caption “We respect your feelings.” DEP’T OF TRANSP. & PUB. FACILITIES, STATE
OF ALASKA, A PRIMER FOR ROADSIDE MEMORIALS (n.d.), available at http://www.
dot.state.ak.us/stwddes/dcsrow/assets/pdf/roadsidememorials.pdf.
253. See JANET L. DOLGIN, SYMBOLIC ANTHROPOLOGY: A READER IN THE STUDY OF SYM-
BOLS AND MEANINGS 185 (Janet L. Dolgin et al. eds., 1977).
254. Wagner, supra note 62 (thesis at 84).
255. Id. at 85.
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the expressive right to memorialize a loved one is not unbounded.  The
Supreme Court has noted that “the First Amendment does not guar-
antee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or
in any manner that may be desired.”256
A. Adequacy of Alternative Channels of Communication
When All Roadside Memorials Are Banned
For the states that prohibit all roadside memorials, the question
arises whether such a prohibition abridges the Free Speech interests
of the memorial maker.  Content-neutral restrictions on speech in
public fora are considered reasonable time, place, and manner regula-
tions if they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest and leave open adequate alternative channels of communica-
tion.257  The Supreme Court has emphasized that time, place, and
manner restrictions “are not invalid simply because there is some im-
aginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech;” in-
deed, such regulations “must be narrowly tailored to serve the
government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests but . . . need not be
the least-restrictive or least-intrusive means of doing so.”258
The courts have confirmed that states may regulate signage and
commercial advertising based on aesthetic and traffic safety con-
cerns.259  These significant governmental interests extend to both
256. Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981).
257. For urban streets, which like city parks are generally viewed as traditional public
fora, a valid time, place, and manner regulation must satisfy three criteria: (1)
content-neutral; (2) serve significant governmental interests; and (3) leave open
adequate alternative channels of communication. See Ward v. Rock Against Ra-
cism, 491 U.S. 781, 798–99 (1989); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981).  Content-based regulations, on the other
hand, must (1) be necessary, (2) serve a compelling governmental interest, and
(3) be narrowly drawn to achieve that end.  Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
269–70 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461, 464–65 (1980).
258. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798–99.
259. See, e.g., Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
790–91 (1984); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984);
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 514–17 (1981); Lindsay v.
City of San Antonio, 821 F.2d 1103, 1109–11 (5th Cir. 1987) (upholding a total
ban on portable signs because (1) the ordinance furthered the city’s aesthetic in-
terest, (2) ban of portable signs was not substantially broader than necessary to
protect that interest, and (3) there were ample methods of communication availa-
ble as alternatives to portable signs); Harnish v. Manatee Cnty., Fla., 783 F.2d
1535, 1540 (11th Cir. 1986) (upholding a total ban on portable and changeable
copy temporary signs because the ban “advanced the governmental goal of pro-
tecting the aesthetic environment of Manatee County, and the record [was] bare
of evidence from which it might be inferred that less restrictive means existed to
accomplish the objective . . .”); see also Prime Media, Inc. v. City of Brentwood,
398 F.3d 814, 823 (6th Cir. 2005) (emphasizing that “billboard regulations,
whatever other strengths and weaknesses they may have, advance a police power
interest in curbing community blight and in promoting traffic safety”).
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commercial and noncommercial speech.  In upholding a city’s ban on
all signs on public property, the Supreme Court ruled the ordinance
was a constitutionally permissible time, place, and manner restriction
for three reasons.260  First, the government has a “weighty, essen-
tially esthetic interest” in reducing visual clutter.261  Second, content-
neutral regulation applied regardless of the subject matter on the
signs.262  And third, there were ample alternative channels of commu-
nication because the ban did not extend to private property, and noth-
ing indicated that these signs were a “uniquely valuable or important
mode of communication.”263
In evaluating the availability of alternative channels of communi-
cation, some courts require that an alternative means provide only a
“reasonable opportunity” for the speaker to communicate the mes-
sage,264 whereas other courts focus more on the adequacy of the avail-
able communicative avenues.265  The Supreme Court has explained
that alternative channels that “involve more cost and less autonomy”
are “less likely to reach persons not deliberately seeking sales infor-
mation,” are “a less effective media for communicating the message,”
and are thus “far from satisfactory.”266  The Supreme Court has
struck down regulations that afford such unsatisfactory alternative
channels.267  However, courts are unwilling to invalidate a regulation
260. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 811–15.  The inquiry into “ample alternative
channels of communication” is not coextensive with the “less restrictive means”
test.  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has clarified that “less restrictive
means” examines whether there are other, equally effective regulations that are
less restrictive of protected activity, whereas “ample alternative channels” exam-
ines whether the remaining modes of communication are sufficient and
equivalent to the prohibited modes.  Wis. Action Coal. v. City of Kenosha, 767
F.2d 1248, 1254 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985) (“It is important to distinguish ‘less restrictive
means’ (or equivalently ‘less restrictive alternatives’) from ‘ample alternative
channels.’  The former denotes an inquiry into whether there are other regula-
tions which are less restrictive of protected activity but protect the governmental
interest served by the challenged regulation.  The ‘ample alternative channels’
inquiry focuses on methods of communication and asks whether those methods
not prohibited by the challenged regulation are equivalent to the prohibited
methods.”).
261. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 806.
262. Id. at 810–12.
263. Id. at 812.
264. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986); Galena
v. Leone, 638 F.3d 186, 203 (3d Cir. 2011).
265. See, e.g., Nat’l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 745 (1st Cir.
1995) (noting “the lens of inquiry must focus not on whether a degree of curtail-
ment exists, but on whether the remaining communicative avenues are
adequate”).
266. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977) (internal citations
omitted).
267. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516 (1981) (ample
alternative channels not available); Linmark Assocs., 431 U.S. at 93 (alternatives
unsatisfactory).
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simply because it restricts the speaker’s “preferred method of
communication.”268
Courts have also found alternative channels of communication in-
adequate when the regulation forecloses “an entire medium of public
expression across the landscape of a particular community or set-
ting.”269  The Supreme Court has been troubled by laws that com-
pletely foreclose an entire medium of expression.  The Court struck
down ordinances that completely banned the distribution of pam-
phlets within a municipality,270 handbills on the public streets,271
door-to-door distribution of literature,272 and live entertainment.273
While prohibitions that completely foreclose an entire medium may be
content-neutral, the Court emphasized “the danger they pose to the
freedom of speech is readily apparent—by eliminating a common
means of speaking, such measures can suppress too much speech.”274
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has identified four factors to
consider in determining whether alternatives for communication are
ample and adequate.275  First, “[a]n alternative is not ample if the
speaker is not permitted to reach the intended audience.”276  Second,
an alternative avenue is not adequate if the location of the expressive
activity is part of the expressive message.277  Third, an alternative fo-
rum is not adequate if it burdens the spontaneity of the speech, like
268. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. Local 586 v. NLRB, 540 F.3d 957,
969 (9th Cir. 2008); accord Saieg v. City of Dearborn, 641 F.3d 727, 740 (6th Cir.
2011) (“Any time, place, and manner restriction must leave open ample alterna-
tive channels by which speakers can communicate their messages, although
speakers are not entitled to their best means of communication.”) (internal quota-
tion omitted); Ross v. Early, 758 F. Supp. 2d 313, 322 (D. Md. 2010) (“Speakers
are not entitled to their ideal means of communication; the Constitution demands
only that individuals retain the ability to communicate effectively.”) (internal
quotation omitted).
269. Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1138 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Citizens for
Peace in Space v. City of Colo. Springs, 477 F.3d 1212, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007).
270. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451–52 (1938).
271. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943).
272. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145–49 (1943); Schneider v. Town of
Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 164–65 (1939).
273. Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75–76 (1981).
274. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994).
275. Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach, 574 F.3d 1011, 1025 (9th
Cir. 2009).
276. Id. (quoting Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir.
1990)); see also Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 654 (1981) (“The First Amendment protects the right of every citizen to
reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win
their attention.”).
277. Long Beach, 522 F.3d at 1024 (citing Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 756 (9th Cir.
2004)); Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1138 (9th Cir. 2005).
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requirements for advanced notice or registration.278  And fourth, the
cost and convenience of an alternative channel is a consideration.279
The Ninth Circuit has also noted the “analysis of time, place, and
manner restrictions should include an inquiry into whether the regu-
lation so alters the content of a message in a public forum as to ham-
per speakers from conveying what they mean to convey.”280
A number of states prohibit roadside memorials.  These content-
neutral regulations serve the significant government interests of pro-
tecting traffic safety and community aesthetics.  The unresolved ques-
tion is whether a complete ban on all roadside memorials leaves ample
and adequate alternatives for the mourner’s communication.  Memo-
rial makers can argue that the place of the memorial is so inextricably
intertwined with the message of the memorial that moving the memo-
rial to another place would not be an ample and adequate alternative.
A cemetery or other memorial site is not an adequate substitute for
a roadside memorial.  The “last alive” place is deeply important to me-
morial makers.  The site is of supreme importance because it is sancti-
fied by the spilled blood of the loved one.281  Scholars emphasize “the
issue of placement and place is absolutely critical to the bereaved who
ascribe to the location a special, even a sacred, significance.”282  Place-
ment of the memorial on the “last alive” place has the effect of trans-
forming the public land into a private, sacred space.283
Moving the memorial elsewhere would be ineffective and would vi-
tiate the importance of placing the memorial on the “last alive” place.
The message of remembrance and caution are inextricably inter-
twined with the “last alive” place.284  Thus, the location of the speech
is part of the expressive message.  Changing the location undermines
the message.  As Professor Bednar observes, “Moving the memorial
elsewhere would negate the shrine’s function as a spatially unique
portal between the living and the dead, where mourning intervenes in
the site of trauma.”285  A memorial in a cemetery does not allow the
memorial maker to communicate with the intended audience, namely
278. Long Beach, 522 F.3d at 1024. See also ACLU of Colo. v. City and Cnty. of Den-
ver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1164 (D. Colo. 2008) (explaining that an alternative
requiring a permit or some other type of notice is not an adequate alternative).
279. Long Beach, 522 F.3d at 1024.
280. Galvin, 374 F.3d at 756.
281. See KENNETH E. FOOTE, SHADOWED GROUND: AMERICA’S LANDSCAPES OF VIOLENCE
AND TRAGEDY 8 (Univ. of Tex. Press rev. ed. 2003) (“Sanctification involves the
creation of what geographers term a ‘sacred’ place—a site set apart from its sur-
roundings and dedicated to the memory of an event, person, or group.”).
282. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 239. R
283. Suter, supra note 22, at 53. R
284. See Long Beach, 522 F.3d at 1024.
285. Bednar, supra note 2, at 136. R
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other drivers along the roadway.286  Memorial makers can argue that
they would have no alternative avenue to communicate their caution-
ary tale to other drivers if the memorial is removed from the roadside.
Thus, these memorial signs are a “uniquely valuable or important
mode of communication.”287
These roadside memorials leave visible and poignant reminders of
death on public space.288  Justice John Paul Stevens has acknowl-
edged that sometimes “the location of the sign is a significant compo-
nent of the message it conveys.”289  By removing these memorials
from the site of death, the message of the memorial is altered.  By
eliminating the roadside memorial, would-be memorial makers argue
they do not have an adequate alternative channel to communicate
their messages.
B. Adequacy of Alternative Channels of Communication
When a Uniform, Official Marker Eliminates
Personal Involvement in the Roadside Memorial
Some states prohibit handmade roadside memorials, but offer uni-
form, official markers to commemorate road deaths.  These content-
neutral regulations again serve the significant government interests
of road safety and aesthetics.  But the unresolved question is whether
a policy that eliminates personal involvement and participation with
the creation of the memorial offers an adequate alternative channel of
communication for a would-be memorial maker.
Scholars who have studied roadside memorials suggest that an of-
ficial marker can never fully replace the want or the need of some be-
reaved to remember the deceased at their “last alive” place.290  For
those who would erect a roadside memorial, the personal involvement
is key to the enduring therapeutic merit of the marker.291  And even
when official policies offer an official marker in lieu of a handmade
marker, spontaneous memorials often still occur.292
286. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654
(1981); Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir.
1990).
287. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984).
288. Gibson, supra note 35, at 152. R
289. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 800 (1995) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (plurality opinion).
290. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 226 (“It is increasingly evident, however, that R
official markers, from whatever source, are no substitute for those built by family
and friends.”).
291. Id. at 240.
292. Id. at 241(“Whether they seek to eliminate or to standardize roadside memorials,
policy makers and enforcement personnel will continue to be frustrated by the
spontaneous memorial conundrum.”).
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Erecting state-approved markers while banning privately-made
memorials may offer an inadequate alternative channel of communi-
cation, and this inadequacy is illustrated in two ways.  First, the be-
reaved will often quickly replace a removed memorial.293
Anthropology professor Sylvia Grider has observed that even when
state officials remove roadside memorials, the bereaved “simply re-
place them.”294  And second, the bereaved will often supplement a
sanctioned marker or erect a private memorial nearby.295  The mother
of a 21-year-old who was killed in a car accident recently told a jour-
nalist that a state-issued sign “would not be personal enough” for
her.296  When state-issued signs are insufficient, the bereaved will
often find ways to personalize the sign and create a memorial.  Profes-
sor Kennerly notes that she has personally “encountered numerous
small shrines at the base of state-sanctioned markers in both Florida
and New Mexico.”297  By either supplementing an official marker or
by erecting a handmade memorial in addition to a state marker, the
bereaved are communicating that the official marker alone is an inad-
equate alternative for communication.
Scholars observe that memorial makers are generally not con-
strained legally or culturally.  Memorial makers evince a self-pos-
sessed moral authority to erect their own memorial and to grieve the
way they want and need to.298  Eliminating personal involvement in
the memorial gives would-be memorial makers a claim that such a
policy burdens the spontaneity of the speech and undermines the
expression.299
V. ROADSIDE CROSSES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The Establishment Clause has often been employed as the vehicle
to challenge the display of religious symbols on public property.300
For some in the community, the endorsement of religion through dis-
293. Kennerly, supra note 33, at 246. R
294. Grider, supra note 81 (“I regard the attempts of various authorities to legislate or R
regulate this custom as futile and misguided because those who feel the need to
memorialize their loved ones near the roadways where they died will continue to
do so, regardless of legislation or other attempts at control. In many cases, where
authorities have removed roadside shrines, families and loved ones simply re-
place them.  Tradition is a powerful force in society.”).
295. Kennerly, supra note 33, at 246. R
296. Schneider, supra note 201, at A1.
297. Kennerly, supra note 33, at 246. R
298. Clark & Franzmann, supra note 4, at 586; Haney et al., supra note 4, at 161. R
299. See Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach, 522 F.3d 1010, 1024
(9th Cir. 2008); Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 756 (9th Cir. 2004); ACLU of Colo. v.
City and Cnty. of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1164 (D. Colo. 2008).
300. The Establishment Clause helps insulate religion from politics and vice versa.
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ix (McMillian Publ’g Co. 1986)
(“Given the extraordinary religious diversity of our nation, the establishment
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plays of religious symbols on public lands undermines respect for di-
versity of faith traditions and moral philosophies, whereas others view
the invalidation of public displays of religious symbols as evidence of
hostility toward religion.  This is a hotly contested area of the law, and
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the constitutionality of relig-
ious symbols on public property continues to evolve.301
A. Sometimes the Display of a Cre`che Scene on Public
Property Violates the Establishment Clause, but
Sometimes It Does Not
In this evolving jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has held that
sometimes the government may erect a cre`che, or nativity scene,302 on
public property, but sometimes it may not.303  In Lynch v. Donnelly,
the Court held that a cre`che located in a display near the heart of the
clause functions to depoliticize religion; it thereby helps to defuse a potentially
explosive situation.”).
301. This evolution has not escaped criticism. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the
Supreme Court’s Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 728
(2006) (characterizing Establishment Clause doctrine as “a hopeless muddle” and
arguing that “[a]t one point or another in recent years, one or more of the nine
Justices have signed opinions proposing ten different standards for enforcing the
Establishment Clause”); Roxanne L. Houtman, ACLU v. McCreary County: Re-
building the Wall Between Church and State, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 395, 397
(2005) (“[I]n the past thirty years, the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has become increasingly ambiguous.”); Sarah M. Isgur, “Play in the
Joints”: The Struggle to Define Permissive Accommodation Under the First
Amendment, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 371, 371 (2008) (noting the Supreme
Court has created “multiple and overlapping analytical frameworks” in its Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence); Douglas G. Smith, The Constitutionality of Re-
ligious Symbolism After McCreary and Van Orden, 12 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 93, 94
(2007) (characterizing the Court’s efforts in McCreary and Van Orden as “[doing]
little to clarify the law” and “leaving lower courts to sort out the principles that
resulted in such disparate results regarding substantially similar displays”); L.
Darnell Weeden, A First Amendment Establishment Clause Analysis of Perma-
nent Displays on Public Property as Government Speech, 35 T. MARSHALL L. REV.
217, 221 (2010) (“Establishment Clause law is unquestionably unstable after Mc-
Creary and Van Orden . . . .”).
302. A cre`che is “a visual representation of the scene in the manger in Bethlehem
shortly after the birth of Jesus, as described in the Gospels of Luke and Mat-
thew.”  Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 580 n.4 (1989).
303. Compare Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding display of a cre`che in
the city’s shopping district), with Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573 (striking down
display of a cre`che on the grand staircase of the county courthouse). See also
Elewski v. Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1997) (upholding a cre`che with a ban-
ner reading “Gloria in Excelsis Deo,” located in a park 300 feet from a menorah
and down the street from secular holiday symbols); ACLU of Ky. v. Wilkinson,
895 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1990) (upholding a 15–foot stable, without the figurines
commonly found in a cre`che, located on the grounds of the state capitol, 100 yards
from a Christmas tree); Smith v. Cnty. of Albemarle, 895 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1990)
(holding a cre`che located on the lawn of a county office building unconstitutional).
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city’s shopping district that included a variety of Christmas symbols,
such as “a Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa’s sleigh, candy-
striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, cutout figures representing
such characters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds
of colored lights,” and a “Season’s Greetings” banner was not a viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause.304  Writing for the Court, Chief Jus-
tice Burger applied the three-part Lemon test305 and concluded the
nativity scene was permissible in the context of the city’s overall
Christmas display.306  First, the cre`che had a secular purpose in cele-
brating and depicting the origins of the Christmas holiday and ac-
knowledging our shared national heritage.307  Second, any
advancement of, or benefit to, religion resulting from the scene was
“indirect, remote and incidental” and no more an advancement of re-
ligion than other types of conduct found permissible in prior cases,
such as legislative prayers,308 release time for public school students
to attend religious education,309 tax exemptions for church proper-
ties,310 and Sunday closing laws.311  And third, there was no excessive
entanglement between religion and government because there was no
evidence of ongoing, day-to-day interaction between church and state
304. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.
305. Under the Lemon analysis, a governmental activity or law is constitutional if the
following three criteria are satisfied: (1) it has a secular purpose; (2) the principal
or primary effect of which must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) it
must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.  Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
306. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.
307. Id. at 680 (“When viewed in the proper context of the Christmas Holiday season,
it is apparent that, on this record, there is insufficient evidence to establish that
the inclusion of the cre`che is a purposeful or surreptitious effort to express some
kind of subtle governmental advocacy of a particular religious message. . . . The
cre`che in the display depicts the historical origins of this traditional event long
recognized as a National Holiday.”).
308. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding Nebraska’s use of official
Legislative Chaplains to give opening prayers at sessions of the state legislature).
309. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding a program allowing release of
public school students from classes to attend off-campus religious exercises).
310. Walz v. Tax Comm’n. of  N.Y.C, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding tax exemption for
religious, educational, and charitable organizations). But see Tex. Monthly, Inc.
v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding tax exemption limited to
religious periodicals “effectively endorses religious belief”).
311. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681–83 (“We are unable to discern a greater aid to religion
deriving from inclusion of the cre`che than from these benefits and endorsements
previously held not violative of the Establishment Clause. . . . [And the] display of
the cre`che is no more an advancement or endorsement of religion than the Con-
gressional and Executive recognition of the origins of the Holiday itself as
“Christ’s Mass,” or the exhibition of literally hundreds of religious paintings in
governmentally supported museums.”); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961) (upholding Sunday Closing Laws).
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over the display, and the public expense involved was minimal.312
The Court applied the Lemon analysis in this case, yet it emphasized
its “unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this
sensitive area.”313
Five years later, the Supreme Court in County of Allegheny v.
ACLU,314 held the display of a cre`che on the courthouse’s grand stair-
case violated the Establishment Clause.  The courthouse was the seat
of county government, and the grand staircase was the “main,” “most
beautiful,” and “most public” part of the courthouse.315  But, in the
same case, the Court also held that an 18-foot Chanukah menorah
placed next to a 45-foot Christmas tree outside another local govern-
ment building did not violate the Establishment Clause.316  The
Court’s ruling turned on the “particular physical setting” of each dis-
play.317  The cre`che was not exhibited with any other secular objects
that would detract from the display’s religious message, and it bore an
“indisputably religious” banner praising “Glory to God in the High-
est.”318  By prominently displaying this religious scene in the seat of
local government, the Court observed, “No viewer could reasonably
think that it occupies this location without the support and approval
of the government.”319  On the other hand, the menorah was part of a
combined display with a Christmas tree and sign saluting liberty.320
This combined display celebrated secular aspects of both Judaism and
Christianity.321  The Court recognized that the city could celebrate
312. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684 (“There is no evidence of contact with church authorities
concerning the content or design of the exhibit prior to or since Pawtucket’s
purchase of the cre`che.  No expenditures for maintenance of the cre`che have been
necessary; and since the City owns the cre`che, now valued at $200, the tangible
material it contributes is de minimis.”).
313. Id. at 678–79 (“In each [Establishment Clause] case, the inquiry calls for line
drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be framed. The Establishment Clause like the
Due Process Clauses is not a precise, detailed provision in a legal code capable of
ready application.”); cf. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973) (noting the
factors identified in Lemon serve as “no more than helpful signposts”).
314. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
315. Id. at 579.
316. Id. at 597.
317. Id. (“Accordingly, our present task is to determine whether the display of the
cre`che and the menorah, in their respective ‘particular physical settings,’ has the
effect of endorsing or disapproving religious beliefs.”).
318. Id. at 598.
319. Id. at 600 (“Thus, by permitting the ‘display of the cre`che in this particular physi-
cal setting,’ the county sends an unmistakable message that it supports and pro-
motes the Christian praise to God that is the cre`che’s religious message.”)
(internal citation omitted).
320. Id. at 614 (“The necessary result of placing a menorah next to a Christmas tree is
to create an ‘overall holiday setting’ that represents both Christmas and
Chanukah—two holidays, not one.”).
321. Id. at 617–18 (“The 45–foot tree occupies the central position beneath the middle
archway in front of the Grant Street entrance to the City–County Building; the
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Christmas and Chanukah as cultural traditions, independent of their
religious significance.322  Rather than endorsing religion, the Court
found the display of the menorah, the Christmas tree, and the sign
saluting liberty had the effect of acknowledging that “both Christmas
and Chanukah are part of the same winter-holiday season, which has
attained a secular status in our society.”323
B. Sometimes a Government Display of the Ten
Commandments on Public Property Violates the
Establishment Clause, but Sometimes It Does Not
The Supreme Court has held that sometimes a city may display the
Ten Commandments on public property, but sometimes it may not.324
On the same day, the Supreme Court issued two differing opinions on
the constitutionality of displaying the Ten Commandments on public
property.  Justice Stephen Breyer provided the key swing vote in the
two cases.
In Van Orden v. Perry, a 6-foot tall monument inscribed with the
Ten Commandments was placed among seventeen monuments and
twenty-one historical markers on the twenty-two acres surrounding
the Texas State Capitol.325  The monument was donated and erected
18–foot menorah is positioned to one side.  Given this configuration, it is much
more sensible to interpret the meaning of the menorah in light of the tree, rather
than vice versa. In the shadow of the tree, the menorah is readily understood as
simply a recognition that Christmas is not the only traditional way of observing
the winter-holiday season.  In these circumstances, then, the combination of the
tree and the menorah communicates, not a simultaneous endorsement of both the
Christian and Jewish faiths, but instead, a secular celebration of Christmas cou-
pled with an acknowledgment of Chanukah as a contemporaneous alternative
tradition.”).
322. Id. at 615 (“Because government may celebrate Christmas as a secular holiday, it
follows that government may also acknowledge Chanukah as a secular holiday.
Simply put, it would be a form of discrimination against Jews to allow Pittsburgh
to celebrate Christmas as a cultural tradition while simultaneously disallowing
the city’s acknowledgment of Chanukah as a contemporaneous cultural
tradition.”).
323. Id. at 616.  Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement” approach, refined the Lemon analy-
sis. See id. at 592 (adopting Justice O’Connor’s approach); Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
324. Compare Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion) (holding the
Establishment Clause was not violated by a long-standing public display of the
Ten Commandments on the grounds of a state capitol), with McCreary Cnty. v.
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding the Establishment Clause was violated by
the display of the Ten Commandments in two Kentucky courthouses).
325. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681.  The 17 monuments are “Heroes of the Alamo,
Hood’s Brigade, Confederate Soldiers, Volunteer Fireman, Terry’s Texas Rang-
ers, Texas Cowboy, Spanish-American War, Texas National Guard, Ten Com-
mandments, Tribute to Texas School Children, Texas Pioneer Woman, The Boy
Scouts’ Statue of Liberty Replica, Pearl Harbor Veterans, Korean War Veterans,
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in 1961 by a private civic and patriotic organization.326  In analyzing
the Establishment Clause issue, a plurality of the Court stated the
Lemon test was “not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monu-
ment that Texas has erected on its Capitol grounds.  Instead, our
analysis is driven both by the nature of the monument and by our
Nation’s history.”327  The plurality also recognized the religious signif-
icance of the Decalogue, as well as its “undeniable historical mean-
ing,” and concluded “[s]imply having religious content or promoting a
message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the
Establishment Clause.”328  The plurality held the inclusion of the Ten
Commandments monument for nearly forty years among the other po-
litical and legal monuments on the Capitol grounds was not a viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause.329
Justice Breyer provided the fifth vote and wrote separately to con-
cur in the judgment that the monument was not a violation of the
Establishment Clause.330  Justice Breyer noted that “the Establish-
ment Clause does not compel the government to purge from the public
sphere all that in any way partakes of the religious.”331  He acknowl-
edged Van Orden was a “borderline case,” and in evaluating difficult
borderline cases, Justice Breyer saw “no test-related substitute for the
exercise of legal judgment.”332  He emphasized the need to “remain
faithful to the underlying purposes of the [Religion] Clauses” and
“take account of context and consequences measured in light of those
purposes.”333  In this fact-intensive examination, Justice Breyer found
the context and physical setting of the display suggested the state in-
tended the “nonreligious aspects of the tablets’ message to
Soldiers of World War I, Disabled Veterans, and Texas Peace Officers.” Id. at 681
n.1.
326. Id. at 682.
327. Id. at 686; cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984) (“There is an unbroken
history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of government of the role
of religion in American life from at least 1789.”); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
434 (1962) (“The history of man is inseparable from the history of religion.”).
328. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690; cf. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per
curiam) (holding unconstitutional a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of the
Ten Commandments in every public schoolroom because of the statute’s plainly
religious purpose).
329. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691–92.
330. Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the judgment can be seen as the controlling opin-
ion in Van Orden. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrow-
est grounds.”) (internal quotations omitted).
331. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring).
332. Id. at 700.
333. Id.
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predominate.”334  The display was donated by a secular civic organiza-
tion and the monument itself “prominently acknowledge[d]” its donor,
which “further distance[d] the State itself from the religious aspect of
the Commandments’ message.”335  And the physical setting of the
monument “suggest[ed] little or nothing of the sacred” and did “not
readily lend itself to meditation or any other religious activity.”336  Fi-
nally, Justice Breyer emphasized that forty years had passed, during
which time the monument had not been challenged.337  This length of
time suggested to him that “few individuals, whatever their system of
beliefs, are likely to have understood the monument as amounting, in
any significantly detrimental way, to a government effort to favor a
particular religious sect, [or] primarily to promote religion over nonre-
ligion . . . .”338
In McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, issued the same day as
Van Orden, Justice Breyer voted with a five-to-four majority to hold
the display of the Ten Commandments in two Kentucky courthouses
violated the Establishment Clause.339  Two Kentucky counties promi-
nently displayed large, gold-framed copies of an abridged text of the
King James version of the Decalogue in courthouse hallways.  After
the lawsuits were filed, the Ten Commandments were supplemented
with secular historical and legal documents, such as the Star Span-
gled Banner’s lyrics and the Declaration of Independence.340  Accord-
ing to the counties, the purpose of displaying the Ten Commandments
along with the other documents was to emphasize the significant role
these texts played in the foundation of the American system of law
and government.341  Yet, foundational documents like the Fourteenth
Amendment and the original Constitution of 1787 were not included
in the display.342  Writing for the majority, Justice David Souter noted
“under the Establishment Clause detail is key.”343  And after examin-
ing the iterations of the displays, the Court found the displays failed
the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test because the dominant
religious nature of the Ten Commandment display was
unmistakable.344
334. Id. at 701.
335. Id. at 701–02.
336. Id. at 702.
337. Id. at 679.
338. Id.
339. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (Justice Souter wrote the
opinion of the Court and was joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsburg, and
Breyer).
340. Id. at 853–54.
341. Id. at 870–71.
342. Id. at 872.
343. Id. at 867.
344. Id. at 872 (“No reasonable observer could swallow the claim that the Counties
had cast off the [sectarian] objective so unmistakable in the earlier displays.”).
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C. Sometimes Religious Displays on Public Property Are
Government Speech, Which Is Immune from Free
Speech Challenges, but Sometimes They Are
Private Speech on Public Property
In evaluating religious displays on public property, the Supreme
Court has sometimes held that the displays are government speech,
which is immune from Free Speech challenges, but sometimes they
are private speech on public property.  In 2009, a religious sect
brought a Free Speech challenge to a government’s refusal to display
its religious monument on public property.345  Interestingly, the relig-
ious organization did not pursue an Establishment Clause challenge
to the government’s display of another religious monument on public
property.  In a public park in Pleasant Grove City, Utah, eleven pri-
vately donated monuments, including a Ten Commandments monu-
ment, were on permanent display.346  Summum, a religious
organization founded in 1975, sought to erect a stone monument in
the park containing the “Seven Aphorisms” of Summum.347  When the
city refused, Summum brought suit arguing the city violated the Free
Speech Clause by accepting a Ten Commandments monument and de-
nying the Seven Aphorisms monument.348
In rejecting Summum’s challenge, the Court explained in Pleasant
Grove City, Utah v. Summum that the Free Speech Clause has no ap-
plication where the state is engaging in its own speech: “The Free
Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it
does not regulate government speech.”349  The Court explained that
unlike speeches and other transitory expressive acts, “the placement
of a permanent monument in a public park is best viewed as a form of
government speech and is therefore not subject to scrutiny under the
Free Speech Clause.”350  While the line between private speech and
government speech at times may be difficult to discern, in this in-
stance the Court had no trouble determining it was government
speech: “Permanent monuments displayed on public property typi-
cally represent government speech.”351  Government can speak
through its own government-financed monuments, but it can also
speak through privately financed monuments that a government
elects to accept and display.352  Governments exercise selection and
345. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
346. Id. at 464.
347. Id. at 465.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 467.
350. Id. at 464.
351. Id. at 470.
352. Id. at 470–71 (“Just as government-commissioned and government-financed
monuments speak for the government, so do privately financed and donated mon-
uments that the government accepts and displays to the public on government
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control over the permanent monuments that are displayed on public
lands; thus, the message from these displays is government speech.353
The Court explained that because installing permanent monu-
ments in a public park is not analogous to delivering speeches or hold-
ing marches and demonstrations, the traditional public forum
analysis does not apply to permanent monuments.354  Public parks
are capable of accommodating a large number of public speakers
“without defeating the essential function of the land,” but these parks
“can accommodate only a limited number of permanent monu-
ments.”355  “Speakers, no matter how long-winded, eventually come to
the end of their remarks; persons distributing leaflets and carrying
signs at some point tire and go home; monuments, however, endure.
They monopolize the use of the land on which they stand and interfere
permanently with other uses of public space.”356  The Court also dis-
tinguished temporary, seasonal displays from permanent monuments:
“Although some public parks can accommodate and may be made gen-
erally available for temporary private displays, the same is rarely true
for permanent monuments.”357  While the forum analysis generally
does not apply to permanent monuments on public property, the Court
did illustrate an instance when the public forum doctrine could apply:
“[F]or example, if a town created a monument on which all of its re-
sidents (or all those meeting some other criterion) could place the
name of a person to be honored or some other private message [the
forum doctrine might properly be applied to a permanent
monument].”358
land.”); cf. id. at 485 (Souter, J., concurring) (“I have qualms, however, about ac-
cepting the position that public monuments are government speech
categorically.”).
353. Id. at 472 (majority opinion) (“Government decisionmakers select the monuments
that portray what they view as appropriate for the place in question, taking into
account such content-based factors as esthetics, history, and local culture.  The
monuments that are accepted, therefore, are meant to convey and have the effect
of conveying a government message, and they thus constitute government
speech.”).
354. Id. at 478.
The obvious truth of the matter is that if public parks were considered to
be traditional public forums for the purpose of erecting privately donated
monuments, most parks would have little choice but to refuse all such
donations.  And where the application of forum analysis would lead al-
most inexorably to closing of the forum, it is obvious that forum analysis
is out of place.
Id. at 480.
355. Id. at 478.
356. Id. at 479.
357. Id. at 480 (distinguishing Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753 (1995), where a private group, the Ku Klux Klan, requested to erect a
cross for a period of sixteen days on public property that had been opened up for
similar temporary displays, including a Christmas tree and a menorah).
358. Id.
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During the term following Summum, in Salazar v. Buono, the
Court again faced the issue of displaying a religious symbol donated
by a private entity on public land.359  In 1934, members of the Veter-
ans of Foreign Wars placed a Latin cross in the Mojave Desert to
honor American soldiers who died in World War I.360  The cross was
located on federal land in the Mojave National Preserve on a granite
outcropping known as Sunrise Rock.361  The cross was made of four-
inch diameter white metal pipes and was less than eight feet tall.362
It had been replaced or repaired a number of times over the years.
The Ninth Circuit, in 2004, affirmed the district court’s permanent
injunction on the grounds the display violated the Establishment
Clause because the Mojave cross conveyed an impression of govern-
mental endorsement of religion.363  Because the Government did not
appeal the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the cross violated the Es-
tablishment Clause, that judgment became final and unreviewable
upon the expiration of the deadline for filing a petition for
certiorari.364
While the Mojave cross case was pending before the lower courts,
Congress, in a series of legislative enactments between 2001 and
2004, twice prohibited the use of federal funds to remove the cross,365
designated the cross a national memorial,366 and then transferred the
one acre of land on which the Mojave cross sits to the Veterans of For-
eign Wars with the requirement that if the cross ceased to be a war
memorial, the land would revert to the federal government.367  Peti-
tioner challenged Congress’s land transfer as a violation of the district
court’s original permanent injunction.368  The Ninth Circuit agreed
the land transfer was a violation of the permanent injunction and af-
firmed the district court’s order.369  The Supreme Court ruled five to
four that the land transfer did not violate the district court’s original
injunction.370  The Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower
359. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
360. Id. at 1811 (2010) (plurality opinion).
361. Id. at 1811.
362. Id. at 1812.
363. Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 548–549 (9th Cir. 2004).
364. See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1813–14.
365. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106–554, § 133, 114 Stat. 2763,
2763A–230 (2000); Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
107–248, § 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1519, 1551 (2002).
366. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107–117, § 8137(a), 115
Stat. 2230, 2278 (2002).
367. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108–87, § 8121(a)-(e), 117
Stat. 1054, 1100 (2003).
368. Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
369. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2007).
370. Id. at 1071.
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court to decide whether or not the land transfer constituted an “illicit
governmental purpose.”371
The narrow grounds of the Salazar v. Buono decision leave un-
resolved many of the questions that are raised by the presence of a
memorial cross on public land.  In dicta, the plurality in Salazar noted
that the government need not eradicate all religious symbols in the
public realm to avoid governmental endorsement of religion: “A cross
by the side of a public highway marking, for instance, the place where
a state trooper perished need not be taken as a statement of govern-
mental support for sectarian beliefs.”372
On the heels of the Salazar opinion, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that 12-foot memorial crosses erected on public prop-
erty for fallen highway patrol troopers, bearing the highway patrol’s
official symbol, violated the Establishment Clause.373  The private or-
ganization that erected the memorial crosses explained that a cross
was selected to memorialize the officer because “only a white cross
could effectively convey the simultaneous messages of death, honor,
remembrance, gratitude, sacrifice, and safety.”374  The crosses dis-
played the honored trooper’s name, rank, and badge number, the offi-
cial state trooper “beehive” symbol, the deceased trooper’s picture, and
a plaque with the trooper’s biographical information.375  On public
land, the memorial crosses were privately maintained and owned.376
The state of Utah expressly stated it neither officially approved nor
disapproved of the memorial markers, but it nevertheless gave the
private organization permission to erect thirteen markers on public
property throughout the state, two of which were erected in front of a
highway patrol office.377
371. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819–21 (2010).
372. Id. at 1818 (plurality opinion).  The plurality also explained that “a Latin cross is
not merely a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs.  It is a symbol often used to honor
and respect those whose heroic acts, noble contributions, and patient striving
help secure an honored place in history for this Nation and its people.” Id. at
1820.
373. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2010), amended and reh’g
denied, Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. de-
nied, Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011).  The
Supreme Court issued the Salazar opinion on April 28, 2010, and the Tenth Cir-
cuit panel issued its American Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan opinion on August 18,
2010.  The Tenth Circuit delayed issuing its Duncan opinion, awaiting the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Salazar. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1152 n.5.  Rehearing en
banc in American Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport was denied on December 20, 2010.
Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1101.
374. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1151.
375. Id. at 1150.
376. Id. at 1151.
377. Id. at 1151, 1151 n.3.
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The Tenth Circuit rejected the memorial maker’s Free Speech ar-
guments.378  Relying on the Supreme Court’s Pleasant Grove City,
Utah v. Summum language, the circuit court was persuaded that
these were “privately financed and donated monuments that the gov-
ernment accept[ed] and display[ed] to the public on government land,”
for which “as a general matter, [the Free Speech Clause’s] forum anal-
ysis simply does not apply.”379  The Tenth Circuit thus determined
that these memorial crosses were not private speech on public land,
but rather were government speech, “the scope and content of which is
restrained, inter alia, by the Establishment Clause.”380
Evaluating the Establishment Clause challenge, the Tenth Circuit
applied the Lemon test381 and could “discern a plausible secular pur-
pose” in erecting the memorial crosses to commemorate fallen troopers
and to promote highway safety.382  Yet the court found the memorials
had the impermissible effect of conveying to a reasonable observer
that the state was endorsing Christianity.383  The court distinguished
Christmas displays from the memorial crosses because Christmas
“has been widely embraced as a secular holiday” while “there is no
evidence in this case that the cross has been widely embraced by non-
Christians as a secular symbol of death.”384  The court also distin-
guished a permissible Ten Commandments display, when part of a
historical presentation, from the memorial crosses here because the
crosses “stand alone, adorned with the state highway patrol insignia
and some information about the trooper who died there.”385  Addition-
ally, the court noted that these 12-foot memorial crosses were ten
times larger than typical roadside memorials, which were often be-
tween twelve and sixteen inches tall.386  The size and location of the
crosses bolstered the court’s conclusion that a reasonable observer
would believe that the state was endorsing Christianity through the
use of the Latin cross, which “is unequivocally a symbol of the Chris-
tian faith.”387
378. Id. at 1150.
379. Id. at 1154 (quoting Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470,
480 (2009)).
380. Id.
381. Id. at 1156 (acknowledging that while the test has been much maligned, “the
touchstone for Establishment Clause analysis remains the tripartite test set out
in Lemon”) (citations omitted).  The Tenth Circuit interpreted the purpose and
effect prongs of the Lemon test in light of Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test,
which makes the “inquiry very case-specific.” Id. at 1157.
382. Id. at 1157.
383. Id. at 1160.
384. Id. at 1161–62.
385. Id. at 1162.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 1159 (quoting Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, N.M., 541 F.3d 1017, 1022
(10th Cir. 2008)); see also id. at 1161 (“We agree that a reasonable observer would
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The Tenth Circuit split five to four, denying rehearing of the case
en banc.388  The private organization that erected the memorial
crosses appealed to the Supreme Court.389  The Court declined the op-
portunity to rule on whether a cross on the public roadway to com-
memorate the “last alive” place of a fallen state trooper is an
Establishment Clause violation.390  In his dissent from the denial of
the writ of certiorari, Justice Thomas said, “Today the Court rejects an
opportunity to provide clarity to an Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence in shambles.”391
In light of this “jurisprudence in shambles,” state and local govern-
ments are left with little guidance in charting a course for adopting
policies on roadside memorials.  In the appeal of the Tenth Circuit
case, twenty states filed an amicus brief asking the Supreme Court to
accept the petition for certiorari and clarify whether states may offer
memorials and monuments that include religious imagery.392  The
states also sought guidance on whether an official, state-sponsored
memorial sign that is augmented with religious symbols by a private
person would run afoul of the Establishment Clause.393  The brief con-
cluded with the following plea: “Some states may decide to exclude
religious imagery from official memorials, while others may permit it
in some sensible way. But a state’s policy should not be influenced by
confusion about what the Establishment Clause requires.”394
VI. CONSIDERING A CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE
ROADSIDE CROSS MEMORIAL
Memorial makers are avoiding readily available alternative ave-
nues for ventilating their expression.  By avoiding or supplementing
the cemetery memorial, these bereaved are communicating that the
recognize these memorial crosses as symbols of death. However, we do not agree
that this nullifies their religious sectarian content because a memorial cross is
not a generic symbol of death; it is a Christian symbol of death that signifies or
memorializes the death of a Christian.”); id. at 1162 (“[T]he mere fact that the
cross is a common symbol used in roadside memorials does not mean it is a secu-
lar symbol.”).
388. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 12 (2011).
389. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 132 S. Ct. 12 (Nos. 10-1276 & 10-1297) (Oct. 31,
2011).
390. Id.
391. Id. at 13 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk,
132 S. Ct. 2535, 2535 (2012) (Alito, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (“This
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is undoubtedly in need of clarity
. . . .”).
392. Brief for the States of Louisiana et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Am. Atheists, 132 S. Ct. 12 (No. 10-1297), 2011 WL 2066580, at *9–*10.
393. Id. at *9.
394. Id. at *10.
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cemetery is an inadequate avenue for their expression.  The growing
popularity of this mode of expression, which raises traffic safety, aes-
thetics, and religious neutrality concerns, forces policymakers to de-
cide whether to regulate this expression.
If policymakers either ignore or expressly permit roadside crosses,
it remains unresolved whether states open themselves up to an Estab-
lishment Clause challenge by tacitly or expressly permitting crosses to
remain on public lands.  Governments must be careful not to appear to
endorse religion by adopting the message of the memorial cross on
public land.  As Justice Souter observed, “[W]henever a government
maintains a monument [that] has some religious character, the spec-
ter of violating the Establishment Clause will behoove it to take care
to avoid the appearance of a flatout establishment of religion, in the
sense of the government’s adoption of the tenets expressed or symbol-
ized.”395  To assess Establishment Clause concerns created by road-
side crosses on public roadways, it is important to determine both the
speaker and the message.
In light of the post-modern sensibilities evinced by the Supreme
Court in Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, it is unclear who the
speaker is or what the message is when a roadside cross is erected on
public property.  The Summum Court recognized that “it frequently is
not possible to identify a single ‘message’ that is conveyed by an object
or structure, and consequently, the thoughts or sentiments expressed
by a government entity that accepts and displays such an object may
be quite different from those of either its creator or its donor.”396
Thus, the message of the original creator of the display may differ
from the message of the entity that expressly or tacitly accepts the
display.397
In evaluating whether speech is private or governmental, the Su-
preme Court has focused on the degree of editorial control over the
message.398  The degree of editorial control and ultimate responsibil-
395. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 486 (2009) (Souter, J.,
concurring).
396. Id. at 476.
397. Id. at 477.
398. Id. at 473 (“Rather, the City has ‘effectively controlled’ the messages sent by the
monuments in the Park.”); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560
(2005) (“The message . . . is effectively controlled by the Federal Government
itself.”); see Haupt, supra note 15, at 571 (arguing for an “effective control” test to
determine legal responsibility when the government and private individuals
jointly engage in speech).  The circuit courts of appeal have refined the test and
created a four-factor analysis for distinguishing between private speech and gov-
ernment speech: (1) the central “purpose” of the program in which the speech in
question occurs; (2) the degree of “editorial control” exercised by the government
or private entities over the content of the speech; (3) the identity of the “literal
speaker;” and (4) whether the government or the private entity bears the “ulti-
mate responsibility” for the content of the speech; see, e.g., Sons of Confederate
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ity for the speech will depend on the contours of the particular policy
adopted by a government.  When a government erects and maintains a
uniform, state-approved roadside memorial, a court is most likely to
conclude the memorial is government speech.399  An official state-
sponsored marker that has a single, uniform message, such as Flor-
ida’s “Drive Safely,” is government speech rather than pure private
speech.  But, as outlined below, policymakers may desire to avoid Es-
tablishment Clause concerns by creating a limited public forum where
editorial control over the content of the speech shifts to a private
speaker.
In addition to the uncertainty about the speaker, there is uncer-
tainty about the message communicated by roadside crosses on public
property.  The Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence
contemplates that a display can have multiple meanings and
messages. Justice Breyer, concurring in Van Orden, concluded the “re-
ligious aspect” of the Decalogue display did not predominate.400  And
the Court in McCreary concluded, after examining the iterations of the
Decalogue displays, that the displays failed the secular purpose prong
of the Lemon test because the dominant religious nature of the dis-
plays was unmistakable.401  The notion that a religious aspect or a
religious nature can predominate implies there are other aspects or
messages that do not predominate, yet still exist.  This suggests a
multiplicity of meanings or messages can exist within a display.  This
multiplicity of meaning was also reflected in Summum: “[T]he monu-
ment may be intended to be interpreted, and may in fact be inter-
preted by different observers, in a variety of ways.”402  The Summum
Court also suggested a certain indefiniteness of meaning because the
message of a display may not be static: “The message that a govern-
ment entity conveys by allowing a monument to remain on its prop-
erty may also be altered by the subsequent addition of other
monuments in the same vicinity.”403
Roadside memorials are multivocal.  They can simultaneously com-
municate more than one message, on behalf of more than one speaker.
Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r, Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618–19 (4th
Cir. 2002); Wells v. City and Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir.
2001); Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d
1085, 1093–94 (8th Cir. 2000).
399. Cf. ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 376–77 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding the
“Choose Life” specialty license plate was government speech and not private
speech because the state had veto power over the design and authority over every
word used; it was thus the state’s “own message”).
400. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701–02 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
401. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 872 (2005).
402. Summum, 555 U.S. at 474.  In light of this multiplicity of meaning, it is unclear if
a display’s meaning is entirely subjective.  However, it is unlikely the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence will go this route.
403. Id. at 477.
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Identifying a single, predominant message can sometimes be difficult,
and such messages may change over time.404  For example, a single,
festooned memorial along a roadway sends a different message than a
mass of memorials stretched along a highway.  The aggregation of in-
dividual memorials sends a message about the hazardousness of the
highway in a way a single memorial cannot.
In responding to the complex roadside memorial phenomenon,
policymakers vary greatly both in general attitude toward roadside
memorials, as well as in the details and aspects of the particular poli-
cies.  To balance the needs of the bereaved with the needs of the com-
munity, policymakers have three options: (1) completely ban the
activity; (2) do nothing and ignore the memorials; or (3) craft a state
program that strives to balance the competing interests, while not
transgressing the First Amendment.405
A. Total Ban on All Roadside Memorials
Policymakers have broad discretion to regulate for the health, wel-
fare, and safety of citizens.406  Traffic safety and community aesthet-
ics are squarely within the purview of states to regulate.407
404. Id. at 476–77.
405. “Having the right memorial policy is significant because transportation agencies
need to balance the safety and maintenance considerations with the needs of
loved ones to grieve for their losses and the people’s desire to memorialise [sic]
certain public figures.”  Tay, supra note 49, at 669. R
406. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985) (“States tradition-
ally have had great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the pro-
tection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.”); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (“The concept of the public welfare is broad and
inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-
balanced as well as carefully patrolled.”); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters,
294 U.S. 405, 429 (1935) (“[T]he police power embraces regulations designed to
promote public convenience or the general welfare, and not merely those in the
interest of public health, safety, and morals.”); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S.
473, 480 (1905) (noting the police power “is an exercise of the sovereign right of
the government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort, and general welfare
of the people”).
407. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984)
(“It is well settled that the state may legitimately exercise its police powers to
advance esthetic values.”); ACORN v. St. Louis County, 930 F.2d 591, 596 (8th
Cir. 1991) (“The government need not wait for [roadway] accidents to justify
safety regulations.”); U.S. Labor Party v. Oremus, 619 F.2d 683, 688 n.4 (7th Cir.
1980) (upholding ban on in-the-roadway solicitation and noting the State need
not wait for personal injuries); see also Chris Hamilton, Safety Concerns Clash
with Roadside Memorials, DULUTH NEWS TRIB., Sept. 23, 2004, at 1A, available at
2004 WLNR 19253579 (“[C]iting safety concerns for drivers and the people who
tend to the memorials . . . the Minnesota Department of Transportation quietly
established a policy to remove hundreds of roadside memorials across the state.”).
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Policymakers have a compelling interest to protect the safety of roads
and welfare of citizens.408  When faced with a state regulating because
of the safety hazards posed by roadside memorials, courts are likely to
view a total ban on all roadside memorials as a reasonable restriction
that serves significant governmental interests.409
Yet memorial makers have a cognizable First Amendment argu-
ment that they lack alternative avenues to communicate the message
of the memorial if it is removed from the roadside.  The Supreme
Court has emphasized that “the First Amendment does not guarantee
the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any
manner that may be desired.”410  And a speaker is not entitled to her
“preferred” or “best” means of communication.411  But restrictions
that completely foreclose “a common means of speaking” are suspect
because they “can suppress too much speech.”412  Such regulations
can “hamper speakers from conveying what they mean to convey.”413
And the message that memorial makers mean to convey is complex
and often idiosyncratic.  Yet scholars observe the common bipartite
message of remembrance of the deceased and warning to other driv-
ers.  The bereaved have an alternative channel to communicate re-
spect for the deceased in a cemetery.  However, by eliminating the
memorial cross from the “last alive” place along the roadside, a signifi-
cant component of the message is lost.  The cautionary tale to other
drivers is inextricably intertwined with the location of the expressive
activity.414
It is an open question whether a court will recognize the dual mes-
sage of the memorial.  If a court recognizes roadside memorials as a
“common means” of sending a caution to other drivers, as well as
maintaining a connection with the deceased, then memorial makers’
lack of alternative avenues to communicate the warning may lead a
court to invalidate a total ban.  On the other hand, if a court concludes
408. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507–08 (1981) (noting the
twin goals “traffic safety and the appearance of the city” are “substantial govern-
mental goals”).
409. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“[E]ven in a public forum
the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner
of protected speech, provided the restrictions are justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information.”) (internal quotation omitted).
410. Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981).
411. Saieg v. City of Dearborn, 641 F.3d 727, 740 (6th Cir. 2011); United Bhd. of
Carpenters & Joiners of Am. Local 586 v. NLRB, 540 F.3d 957, 969 (9th Cir.
2008).
412. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994).
413. Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 756 (9th Cir. 2004).
414. See Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach, 522 F.3d 1010, 1024
(9th Cir. 2008); Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1138 (9th Cir. 2005).
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that the predominant message of the roadside memorial is to com-
memorate the deceased, a court may uphold a total ban on the
grounds the cemetery is an ample alternative avenue to keep the de-
ceased’s memory alive.
If a court determines that a cemetery or other designated memorial
site is an adequate alternative channel to commemorate the deceased,
the policy choice to ban all roadside memorials will likely be upheld in
the face of a Free Speech challenge.415  In practice, only a handful of
states have elected to promulgate a total ban.  And in those states,
enforcement of the ban is lax because removing a grieving family’s
roadside memorial can quickly become a public relations fiasco.416
B. Do-Nothing Approach Toward Roadside Memorials
Some policymakers choose to turn a blind eye to roadside memorial
activity, unless and until someone in the community complains or the
DOT determines the memorial is a traffic hazard.417  This laissez-
faire approach may raise Establishment Clause concerns because an
unauthorized, unattended cross that is nevertheless allowed to re-
main on public property may raise the specter of endorsing Christian-
ity.  In the case of the fallen highway patrol officers, the Tenth Circuit
ruled 12-foot crosses erected and maintained by private individuals
were government speech because the government allowed them to re-
main on public land.418  This holding in Duncan was despite the gov-
ernment’s express statement that it neither approved nor disapproved
of the message.419  A government’s failure to enforce general laws that
prohibit unauthorized signs and items along the roadways may raise
415. See Johnson v. City and Cnty. of Phila., 665 F.3d 486, 490 (3d Cir. 2011) (uphold-
ing city’s ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on utility poles, streetlights,
and trees in a public right-of-way because the content-neutral ordinance was nar-
rowly tailored to serve the city’s interest in safety and aesthetics, and placing
signs on private property provided a sufficient alternative channel to the banned
signs on public property); Frye v. Kan. City Mo. Police Dep’t, 375 F.3d 785, 790-
92 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding the Free Speech rights of pro-life protestors were
not insulated from restrictions on the display of the roadside signs when the
signs jeopardize the health, welfare, and safety of passing motorists); Foti v. City
of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 642 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding city ordinance restrict-
ing size and number of picket signs “was permissible in light of the City’s sub-
stantial interest in requiring drivers to devote greater attention to driving
conditions and the road signs”).
416. See supra notes 248–52 and accompanying text.
417. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 237 (“In some jurisdictions authorities will not R
apply local ordinances until specific complaints are received.”); Dickinson & Hoff-
mann, supra note 9, at 161 (“After receiving a complaint, 91% of the respondents R
said the DOT removes the memorial in response to the complaint and 9% leave
the memorial as is.”).
418. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1154 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470, 480 (2009)).
419. Id.
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an Establishment Clause problem.  And failing to adopt some form of
regulations abdicates a responsibility to balance the competing inter-
ests.  Social contract theory would suggest that government has a duty
to balance competing constitutional interests of its citizen.420  Moreo-
ver, leaving roadside memorials unregulated and unenforced disfavors
those who abide by the law while favoring those who flout the law.
C. State-Sponsored Roadside Memorial Program
Many state policymakers have recognized that turning a blind eye
to the roadside cross phenomenon is not a long-term policy option.
The interests of the bereaved and the community eventually collide.  A
growing number of states have started offering state-sponsored mark-
ers to commemorate the “last alive” place of a loved one.421  Policy-
makers are coming to recognize that banning roadside memorials
wholesale is politically unpopular and ineffective—while nonetheless
constitutionally permissible.  The bereaved have shown an inclination
to construct roadside memorials without regard to the legality of er-
ecting such memorials.  And states that have removed unlawful road-
side memorials have heard an outcry of public condemnation.  As
scholars have observed, “[E]nforcement efforts become a public rela-
tions disaster, especially if memorial builders choose to take their
plight to the public via the media.”422  Policymakers may decide a bet-
ter course is to channel the expression into an avenue that minimizes
both the risks to traffic safety and the risk of creating the appearance
of government endorsement of religion.
State policymakers who seek to afford the bereaved an alternate
avenue of expression could craft a state-sponsored memorial program
that gives the bereaved a voice, while the government retains some
measure of control over the markers to help minimize the safety risks
and aesthetic concerns.  A state-sponsored roadside memorial pro-
gram could afford a limited public forum for the bereaved to construct
their message.423
420. See City of Chi. v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 322 (1911) (“The obligation of the gov-
ernment to protect life, liberty and property against the conduct of the indiffer-
ent, the careless and the evil-minded may be regarded as lying at the very
foundation of the social compact.”); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798) (“The
people . . . erected their Constitutions . . . to establish justice, to promote the
general welfare, to secure the blessings of liberty; and to protect their persons
and property from violence.  The purposes for which men enter into society will
determine the nature and terms of the social compact . . . .”). See also Kirk A.
Kennedy, Reaffirming the Natural Law Jurisprudence of Justice Clarence
Thomas, 9 REGENT U. L. REV. 33, 47 (1997) (“[C]onstitutions are merely manifes-
tations of the social contract . . . .”).
421. See supra notes 197–200 and accompanying text.
422. Collins & Rhine, supra note 2, at 241. R
423. Cf. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 675 (1998) (finding
candidate debate was a limited public forum for private speech because “[t]he
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 94 Side B      08/28/2013   10:13:22
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 94 Side B      08/28/2013   10:13:22
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\92-1\NEB105.txt unknown Seq: 57 27-AUG-13 10:54
180 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:124
1. A Limited Public Forum
The contours and specifics of the limited public forum vary and
could be tailored to the needs of the particular jurisdiction.  For exam-
ple, state signs could be uniform in size and erected where the DOT
determines it to be safe, but the DOT could delegate editorial control
to the bereaved who can customize the message to have a voice in the
memorial.  Alternatively, policymakers could permit a shadowbox-
type structure on a raised platform or pole so mowing operations
would not be disturbed.  The shadowbox-type structure would allow
for three-dimensional objects to be secured off of the ground.  The
state program would need to ensure that the appropriate structure
would be promptly erected as close to the crash site as safely possible.
A two-dimensional sign or a shadowbox-type structure could be per-
mitted on the site for a limited amount of time.  Policymakers could
decide the appropriate length of time, be it three months, six months,
one year, five years, or twenty years.424  Policymakers could also allow
renewable periods after payment of a small processing fee.  After the
allotted time has expired, the next of kin could be given the memorial.
A designated public forum for roadside death memorials could fore-
stall Establishment Clause concerns about government speech endors-
ing a religious message.  A court is likely to find that by allowing the
bereaved to select and customize the message on a state-approved
sign, it is private speech rather than government speech.  The Pinette
Court concluded that private religious speech in a traditional public
forum did not reflect government endorsement of religion because the
government did not sponsor the speech, the speech occurred on prop-
erty specifically held open to the public, and the same application pro-
cess was required of all groups wishing to use the forum.425 As
Justice Souter noted in his Summum concurrence, not all private re-
ligious symbols on public property raise Establishment Clause con-
cerns: “[T]here are circumstances in which government maintenance
very purpose of the debate was to allow the candidates to express their views
with minimal intrusion by the broadcaster”).  A limited public forum is function-
ally equivalent to a nonpublic forum.  Gentala v. City of Tuscan, 213 F. 3d 1055,
1062 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he distinction between a limited public forum and a
nonpublic forum is a semantic distinction without an analytic difference.”); War-
ren v. Fairfax Cnty., 196 F.3d 186, 194 n.8 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (noting the
“limited public forum [is] analytically indistinct from a nonpublic forum”).
424. Transient speech on public property does not reflect on the government the same
way that more permanent forms of expression, like stone monuments, do. See
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 471 (2009).  The Supreme Court
has recognized that private individuals with religious messages, like holiday
carolers or temporary religious displays, on public lands do not evince to the rea-
sonable observer government endorsement of the message. See Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Cnty. of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 612 (1989).
425. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 763.
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of monuments does not look like government speech at all. Sectarian
identifications on markers in Arlington Cemetery come to mind.”426
The Summum Court seemed mindful of the possibility that monu-
ments on public property could reflect private speech to which Free
Speech principles, rather than Establishment Clause concerns, would
apply: “[I]f a town created a monument on which all of its residents (or
all those meeting some other criterion) could place the name of a per-
son to be honored or some other private message [the Free Speech fo-
rum doctrine might properly be applied to the monument].”427  Thus,
the Free Speech review, rather than Establishment Clause scrutiny,
would likely apply to a regulation that allows the bereaved, meeting
some certain criterion, to create a roadside memorial or to place the
name or a private message on a roadside memorial.428
Moreover, the Supreme Court has reiterated that once individuals
are given access to a forum, otherwise qualified individuals cannot be
denied access to the forum because of their “religious perspective.”429
Thus, in a limited public forum, the bereaved could customize and cre-
ate their own message and include religious symbols and messages
because once the government creates a limited public forum for road-
side memorials, it cannot exclude religious messages without engag-
ing in viewpoint discrimination.430  And any remaining
Establishment Clause concerns raised by state-sponsored roadside
memorials could be mitigated by adding a disclaimer.431  With an ap-
propriate disclaimer, the reasonable observer would be aware that it
426. Summum, 555 U.S. at 487 (Souter, J., concurring).
427. Id. at 480.
428. But see Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 303 n.13 (2000) (“[W]e
have never held the mere creation of a public forum shields the government en-
tity from scrutiny under the Establishment Clause.”).
429. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 832 (1995);
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395–96
(1993) (holding a state could not allow secular groups after-hours access to school
premises but deny religious groups the same access); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (holding that since a university’s forum was already availa-
ble to other groups, religious groups could not be excluded).
430. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 113–14, 120 (2001) (ruling
that a school could not deny a Christian club access to school facilities that were
available to other student clubs); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 847–48 (holding a uni-
versity could not deny subsidies to religious student publications when it gave
subsidies to secular student publications).
431. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 776 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I would add the presence of a sign disclaiming gov-
ernment sponsorship or endorsement on the Klan cross, which would make the
State’s role clear to the community.”); id. at 784 (Souter, J., concurring) (“I vote to
affirm in large part because of the possibility of affixing a sign to the cross ade-
quately disclaiming any government sponsorship or endorsement of it.”); see also
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 823–24, 841 (discussing the disclaimers printed in the
student publication and noting “the government has not fostered or encouraged
any mistaken impression that the student newspapers speak for the University”).
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is private religious speech occurring in a limited public forum, rather
than government endorsement of a religious message.432
2. Permissible Limits on a Limited Public Forum
While disclaimers are available to underscore that a message be-
longs to a private individual rather than the government, there could
be instances when a government would not want to allow certain
speech on the public roadways.  States will likely want to circumscribe
the topics communicated on roadside memorials and prevent political
and commercial messages, as well as vulgar sexual references, profan-
ity, or hate speech.  In a limited public forum, a government would not
be forced to entertain just any speech on these memorials.  The gov-
ernment may cabin a limited public forum to its purpose.433  As such,
the government may limit the choice of topics or class speakers in a
limited public forum, but it may not limit the viewpoints expressed.434
Access to a limited public forum may be restricted only if the limita-
tions are “reasonable in light of the purpose” of the forum and are not
based on the speakers’ viewpoints.435
If state policymakers want discretion to limit memorial messages
that offend public sensibilities, such authority would likely pass con-
stitutional muster if the policies are clearly articulated and consist-
ently enforced.436  The Department of Veterans Affairs guidelines on
“Available Emblems of Belief for Placement on Government Head-
stones and Markers” may provide a useful starting point for crafting
such policies.437  These guidelines offer over fifty emblems of belief, as
432. Cf. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 675 (1998) (character-
izing candidate debate as private speech forum in part because of “implicit repre-
sentation of the broadcaster . . . that the views expressed were those of the
candidates [and] not its own”).
433. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (“The necessities of confining a forum to the
limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created may justify the State in
reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.”).
434. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 682; id. at 677–78 (“The government can restrict access to a
nonpublic forum ‘as long as the restrictions are reasonable and [are] not an effort
to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s
view.’” (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 800 (1985)).
435. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
436. See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 NW. U.L. REV. 1357,
1408–28 (2001) (setting out constitutionally permissible access standards for non-
public forums).
437. See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Available Emblems of Belief for Placement
on Government Headstones and Markers, http://www.cem.va.gov/hmm/em-
blems.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2013) (“No graphics (logos, symbols, etc.) are per-
mitted on Government-furnished headstones or markers other than the available
emblems of belief, the Civil War Union Shield, the Civil War Confederate South-
ern Cross of Honor, and the Medal of Honor insignias.”).
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well as a method for requesting additional emblems of belief.438  If the
state DOTs want to retain discretion to deny certain symbols and
messages on memorials, they must promulgate viewpoint-neutral
standards that are consistently applied.439  Applying these neutral
standards “quite precisely”440 is necessary to avoid the appearance
that the government “is seeking to handicap the expression of particu-
lar ideas.”441
As the Court has often repeated, the particular facts of the case
and the context of the display loom large in the Court’s analysis of
Establishment Clause cases.442  Therefore, it is unlikely a single Su-
preme Court case will afford a sweeping answer to the roadside memo-
rial phenomenon or a comprehensive answer to the range of options
and permutations available to state and local policymakers.  Whether
or not a government may display a cre`che scene or the Ten Command-
ments turns on the details and context of the exhibit.  Similarly, the
permissibility of a roadside cross will likely also turn on the details
and context of the display.  Policymakers must struggle to strike a
careful balance between competing interests and concerns of its citi-
zens, while making sure not to endorse someone else’s religious
message.443
438. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 437 (outlining instructions for re-
questing an emblem not available for inscription).
439. Cf. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Free Speech and the Limits of Legislative Discretion:
The Example of Specialty License Plates, 53 FLA. L. REV. 419, 470–71 (2001) (dis-
cussing requirements for a constitutional specialty license plate program).
440. AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 13 (1st
Cir. 1994).
441. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 394 (1992).
442. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989) (noting “the effect
of the government’s use of religious symbolism depends upon its context”); Stone
v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (per curiam) (invalidating a state statute re-
quiring the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments on public classroom
walls because the Commandments were posted purely as a religious admonition,
not “integrated into the school curriculum, where the Bible may constitutionally
be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative relig-
ion, or the like”); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (inval-
idating required daily Bible readings in public schools, yet noting the “study of
the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of
education, may not [offend] the First Amendment”).
443. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 600–01 (“[T]he Establishment Clause does not
limit only the religious content of the government’s own communications.  It also
prohibits the government’s support and promotion of religious communications
by religious organizations.  Indeed, the very concept of ‘endorsement’ conveys the
sense of promoting someone else’s message.  Thus, by prohibiting government en-
dorsement of religion, the Establishment Clause prohibits precisely what oc-
curred here: the government’s lending its support to the communication of a
religious organization’s religious message.”) (internal citation omitted).
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 96 Side B      08/28/2013   10:13:22
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 96 Side B      08/28/2013   10:13:22
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\92-1\NEB105.txt unknown Seq: 61 27-AUG-13 10:54
184 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:124
VII. CONCLUSION
The roadside memorial phenomenon lies at the crossroads of cul-
tural, social, religious, and legal forces.  This Article contributes to the
legal scholarship by drawing together cross-disciplinary research and
delving into the meaning and purpose of roadside memorials.  This Ar-
ticle also examines the legal issues implicated by the Free Speech
Clause and the Establishment Clause.  States that ban all roadside
memorials may face Establishment Clause challenges.  If courts em-
brace the roadside memorial as a means of warning other drivers, as
well as maintaining a connection with the deceased, then memorial
makers’ lack of alternative avenues to communicate the warning may
lead courts to invalidate a total ban.  But if courts conclude the pre-
dominant message of the roadside memorial is to commemorate the
deceased, courts may uphold a total ban on the grounds the cemetery
is an ample avenue to keep the deceased’s memory alive.  States that
choose to ignore, or tacitly permit, roadside memorial crosses also face
Establishment Clause concerns.  Unattended private roadside crosses
that are allowed to remain on public lands risk creating an appear-
ance of government endorsement of the religious message.  However,
for states that choose to create a limited public forum in which the
bereaved can have some measure of control over the message, any re-
ligious message is unlikely to be attributed to the government.  So
long as states create and consistently apply viewpoint-neutral regula-
tions on the types of messages and speakers that are acceptable, and
include an appropriate disclaimer, these regulations are likely to pass
constitutional muster.  This Article offers practical solutions to those
policymakers who seek to reduce the risk of traffic hazards created by
private memorials, while offering an alternative avenue for the be-
reaved to actively participate in creating the message that commemo-
rates the loved one.  Armed with a better understanding and
appreciation of the constitutional consequences, as well as the animat-
ing forces behind these memorials, law and policymakers within each
state can decide how best to regulate these memorials.
